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Abstract
At the end of World War II, the prosecution by the Allies of thousands of enemy war criminals in 
Europe and the Far East, and the creation of International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo, are seen by many as a landmark in the development of international criminal law. This 
development is widely asserted to have given rise to universal jurisdiction over war crimes for the 
prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights offences. By using primary research, the purpose 
of this article is to challenge the perceived emergence of universal jurisdiction and to show that it 
has been allowed to develop as a myth, a hollow concept. The article seeks to provide an alternative 
view, by arguing that jurisdiction over war crimes is better explained as an important development 
of the protective principle, which was exercised collectively by some Allies, for the punishment of a 
‘common enemy’.
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1. Introduction
At the end of World War II, the prosecution by the Allies of thousands of enemy 
war criminals in Europe and the Far East, and the creation of International Mili­
tary Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, are seen by many as a landmark in the 
development of international criminal law. This development is widely asserted 
to have given rise to universal jurisdiction over crimes under international law, 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity, for the prosecution of perpe­
trators of gross human rights offences.1 This makes universality a relatively new 
*) I should like to give special thanks to Professor J. Craig Barker for his guidance, comments and 
inspiration; I am grateful for the constructive comments by the anonymous reviewer.
1) The literature is too numerous to cite, but see Eichmann v. Attorney-General, 36 ILR 277 (Supreme 
Court), pp. 293­300; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), p. 582; Polyukhovich 
v. Commonwealth (1991) 101 ALR 545; U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F2d 56 (2nd Cir. 2003); American Law 
Institute, ‘Restatement of the Law (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States’, (1987) 
para. 404; International Law Association, London Conference, ‘Final Report on the Exercise of 
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development in international law; moreover, the legitimacy of this concept under 
current international law is regarded by many courts and commentators as being 
dependent upon the trial of war criminals in the aftermath of World War II.2 
Although a great deal of work to clarify universal jurisdiction has been under­
taken in recent years, there is neither a consensus on what universal jurisdiction 
is or should be, nor a consensus regarding the crimes covered by the concept, 
either in doctrine or State practice.3 However, it has been suggested to be based 
solely on the ‘heinous’ nature of the crime, the suppression of which is a concern 
of the international community.4 Thus, according to a resolution adopted in 
Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences’, (2000) pp. 3, 22; Thomas H. 
Sponsler, ‘The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials of American Airmen’, 
15 Loyola Law Review (1968­1969) p. 49; Michael Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, 46 
British Yearbook of International Law (1974) p. 160; Kenneth Randall, ‘Universal Jurisdiction’, 66 
Texas Law Review (1987­1988) pp. 802­810; Theodore Meron, ‘International Criminalisation of 
Internal Atrocities’, 89 American Journal of International Law (1995); Theodore Meron, ‘Is 
International Law Moving Towards Criminalisation?’, 9 European Journal of International Law 
(1998); Chris C. Joyner, ‘Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War 
Criminals to Accountability’, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems (1996) pp. 155­156, 166, 172; 
Sharon A. Williams, ‘Laudable Principles Lacking Application: The Prosecution of War Criminals 
in Canada’, in Timothy L.H. McCormack and Gerry J. Simpson (eds.), The Law of War Crimes. 
National and International Approaches (Kluwer, London, 1997) p. 162; Luc Reydams, Universal 
Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) p. 34; 
Michael P. Scharf, ‘Application of Treaty­Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non­State 
Party States’, 35 New England Law Review (2000­2001) p. 369; Madeline H. Morris, ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks’, 35 New England Law Review (2001) pp. 
344­345; Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 112; Anthony Sammons, ‘The “Under­Theorisation” of 
Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts’, 
21 Berkley Journal of International Law (2003) p. 125­126; Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction and the Piracy Analogy’, 45 Harvard International Law Journal (2004) pp. 185, 194­
195; James P. Benoit, ‘The Evolution of Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes’, 53 Naval Law 
Review (2006) p. 264; Mark Chadwick, ‘Modern Developments in Universal Jurisdiction: 
Addressing Impunity in Tibet and Beyond’, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009) p. 362; 
Anja Matwijkiw, ‘The No Impunity Policy in International Criminal Law: Justice versus Revenge’, 
9 International Criminal Law Review (2009); Maximo Langer, ‘The Diplomacy of Universal 
Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes’, 
105 American Journal of International Law (2011) p. 3.
2) Ibid.
3) Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 2002, per Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge van den Wyngaert, p. 166, <www.icj­cij.org/>, 20 April 2012; Report of the Secretary­
General prepared on the basis of comments and observations of governments, The Scope and 
Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (29 July 2010) (U.N. Doc. A/65/181) (hereafter 
S­G Report).
4) Arrest Warrant, ibid., per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., p. 82; per Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, ibid., p. 167; S­G Report, ibid., p. 4; Council of the European 
Union, AU­EU Technical ad hoc Expert Group, Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 
Final Report (16 April 2009) (Doc. 8672/1/09 REV 1), para. 9, <www.universaljurisdiction.org/
images/reports/publications/au_eu_expert_report.pdf>, 20 April 2012 (hereafter AU­EU Expert 
Group); Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs, The Princeton Principles on 
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2005 by the Institute of International Law, certain crimes under international law 
may be prosecuted by any State whatever, having no connection at all with the 
offence, and in the absence of any other bases of jurisdiction recognised by inter­
national law.5
Although universal jurisdiction is generally stagnant in State practice, in recent 
years, the attempt made by a handful of almost exclusively European States to use 
this principle in order to justify proceedings against incumbent State officials 
accused of human right offences in foreign countries has “led to misunderstand­
ings, escalation of inter­State tensions and given rise to perceptions of abuse on 
political or other grounds”.6 What is more, since 2009, the scope and application 
of universal jurisdiction has been the subject of heated debate before the U.N. 
General Assembly and the Sixth Committee, after complaints by African States 
that the principle was being abused.7 The essence of this debate is a perceived 
conflict between two values in modern international law: preventing the impu­
nity of the perpetrators of ‘heinous’ crimes under international law, on the one 
hand, and protecting the principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality and 
independence and the immunity of incumbent State officials before foreign crim­
inal jurisdictions, on the other.8
As no precedent existed prior to World War II for universal jurisdiction over 
crimes under international law,9 and given that it is perhaps the most controver­
sial concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is rather surprising that the princi­
ple’s supposed origins have not received closer scrutiny.
Universal Jurisdiction, p. 45, <www.princeton.edu/­lapa/unive­jur.pdf>, 10 April 2012 (hereafter 
Princeton Principles).
5) Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the 
Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, adopted in Krakow, 2005, <www 
.idi­iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2005_kra_03_fr.pdf>, 10 April 2012; AU­EU Expert Group, ibid., 
para. 8.
6) International Law Commission, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction 
(U.N. Doc. A63/10), para. 283; Arrest Warrant, supra note 3.
7) African Union, The Executive Council, Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of 
Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorneys General (June 2008) (Doc. EX.CL/411(XIII)), <www.africa­union.org/root/au/
Conferences/2009/july/summit/decisions/ASSEMBLYAUDEC243­267 (XIII)_e.pdf>, 1 April 
2012; Decision of Assembly of the African Union on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the 
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (June/July 2008) (Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.199 (XI)), <www 
.africa­union.org/root/au/conferences/2008/june/summit/dec/ASSEMBLYDECISIONS193 
­207(XI).pdf>, 4 April 2012; AU­EU Expert Group, supra note 4, para. 19; U.N. General Assembly 
resolution, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (Official Records of the 
General Assembly, 64th Session, U.N. Doc. A/63.PV.105); S­G Report, supra note 3.
8) See Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al.; per Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, ibid., p. 142.
9) Although piracy is widely asserted as a crime under international law and subject to universal 
jurisdiction, this remained disputed until at least a decade after World War II; see Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas 1958, Article 19, restated in United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 1982, Article 105.
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The purpose of this article is to challenge the generally accepted view, by using 
primary source material, including the reports of trials prepared by the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission (hereafter UNWCC), that the trial of war 
criminals in the aftermath of World War II gave rise to universal jurisdiction.10  
In so doing, the article aims to shed new light on the historical background of the 
current debate about the principle of universal jurisdiction. As will be shown, the 
development of universal jurisdiction has been accepted uncritically, and often 
exaggerated, by courts and commentators, which have persistently either relied 
on tentative, secondary material, or cited primary materials, wholly out of con­
text. This article provides an alternative view, by arguing that jurisdiction over 
war crimes may be better explained as an important development of the protec­
tive principle. The protective principle is little understood and has never before 
been examined in relation to crimes under international law. There is no accepted 
definition of the protective principle either in doctrine or State practice, although 
it is often suggested to permit States under international law to exercise jurisdic­
tion over crimes committed by foreign nationals outside of their territory which 
threaten their vital interests. The principle’s rationale is thus based on the neces­
sity to protect vital State interests, including sovereignty, security, political inde­
pendence and governmental functions.11 As will be explained, in the context of 
the aftermath of World War II, what was often perceived to be universality was in 
fact as expanded principle of protective jurisdiction, which was exercised by some 
of the Allies collectively, for the punishment of a ‘common enemy’. The article 
proposes that there is therefore a crucial conceptual distinction to be made as to 
the basis of jurisdiction over war crimes, between the protection of certain vital 
State interests, which are shared by the international community and protected 
by international law, and universality. This reconceptualisation of jurisdiction 
over war crimes, it is submitted, reflects more accurately the proper role of inter­
national law within the international community.
The article begins by examining the supposed rise of universal jurisdiction over 
war crimes immediately after World War II. Thereafter, it examines the jurisdic­
tion of the military tribunals established by the so­called ‘Great Powers’­Britain, 
United States, Soviet Union and France­within their respective zones of occupied 
Germany for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes 
against peace and shows that jurisdiction was far from ‘universal’. The third part 
of the article explains that the scope of jurisdiction over these crimes was restricted 
to persons belonging to a ‘common enemy’ engaged in a State policy of aggressive 
10) History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War 
(HMSO, London, 1948) (hereafter History); Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals. Selected and 
Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, vols. I­XV (HMSO, London, 1947­1949) 
(hereafter Law Reports).
11) See Ian Cameron, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Dartmouth, 
Aldershot, 1994).
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war. The article then goes on to examine the right under international law to pros­
ecute crimes under international law and suggests that it has traditionally been 
restricted to that of injured States, which was recognised as such by the Allies at 
the end of World War II. As will be explained, jurisdiction over war crimes was 
based on the protective principle, which was justified as part of a broader right of 
self­defence. The article then shows that the protective principle was expanded by 
some of the Allies and, in some cases, exercised collectively, which is perhaps best 
illustrated by the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
Finally, on the basis of State practice in the aftermath of World War II, the article 
proposes that there is a crucial distinction to be made as to the basis of jurisdic­
tion over war crimes, between the protection of vital State interests, which are 
shared by international community, and universality.
2. The ‘Rise’ of Universal Jurisdiction over Crimes under International Law
The trials of war criminals after World War II in Europe and the Far East, aside 
from the principles of territoriality and nationality, concerned the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Allies over crimes committed abroad by persons belonging to 
the ‘enemy’ in two general situations: the first of these was the prosecution by a 
belligerent of war crimes or crimes against humanity against their own or Allied 
nationals; the other was the prosecution by several of the Allied belligerents in 
enemy territory of crimes against peace and war crimes against themselves or 
other Allies, and crimes against humanity committed against German nationals 
and stateless persons on German territory.12 These war crimes trials have been 
widely asserted as the rise of universal jurisdiction over crimes under interna­
tional law.13 In support, courts and commentators have argued that universal 
jurisdiction has developed historically over piracy because it is a ‘heinous’ crime, 
which was extended by the Allies to cover equally heinous crimes other than 
piracy.14 The analogy between war crimes and piracy was first made formally by 
12) E.g., see The Zyklon B Case, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 103; The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I; 
The Belsen Trial, Law Reports, vol. II; The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI; The Krupp Trial, Law 
Reports, vol. X; The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Law Reports, vol. XI; The German High 
Command Trial, Law Reports, vol. XII; Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 43; In re Ohlendorf and Others, 15 
ILR 656.
13) Supra note 1.
14) Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary­General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal: History and Analysis (1949) (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5) p. 80; Eichmann, supra note 1; 
Demjanjuk, supra note 1; The Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT­94­1­AR72, para. 57; R v. Bartle and Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis and Others, ex parte Pinochet; R v Evans and Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis, ex parte Same (Amnesty International and Others intervening), per Lord Browne­
Wilkinson, p. 9; per Lord Millett, ibid., pp. 70­71; Quincy Wright, ‘War Criminals’, 39 American 
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the UNWCC. Lord Wright, the eminent jurist and head of the UNWCC, after 
purportedly examining the trials of war criminals, came to the following 
conclusion:
According to generally recognised doctrine […] the right to punish war crimes is not confined 
to the State whose nationals have suffered or on whose territory the act took place but is 
possessed by any independent State whatever, just as is the right to punish the offence of 
piracy … [E]very Independent State has in International Law jurisdiction to punish pirates 
and war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victims or the place where 
the offence was committed …15
Lord Wright thus endorsed the principle of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, 
by invoking a supposedly analogous right of universality over piracy as a justifica­
tion. In support of the existence of universal jurisdiction, as well as its aforesaid 
definition, which according to Lord Wright was a “generally recognised doctrine”, 
he relied not upon existing State practice, but, rather surprisingly, on academic 
commentary by Cowles.16
Cowles was a Lieutenant­Colonel of the Judge Advocate General’s Department 
for the U.S. and he is regarded as coining the term ‘universal jurisdiction’.17 
Importantly, in his article, Cowles declared that his argument for universal juris­
diction over war crimes was not the view of the U.S. Government. However, in a 
separate article published three years later by Cowles, he made the following 
declaration, as to his doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which is revealing:
It was put forward first in the form of a memorandum made available to the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission in the autumn of 1944. At the suggestion and with the personal 
Journal of International Law (1947) pp. 280­283; Eric S. Kobrick, ‘The Ex­Post Facto Prohibition 
and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes’, 87 Columbia Law Journal 
(1987); Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human Rights 
Violators to Justice’, 107 Yale Law Review (1997) pp. 193, 205­207; Mark R. von Sternberg, 
‘A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and 
the “Elementary Dictates of Humanity”’, 22 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (1996­1997) pp. 
133­134, 151; Leila N. Sadat, ‘Redefining Universal Jurisdiction’, 35 New England Law Review 
(2000­2001) pp. 244­245; Mahmoud C. Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International 
Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice’, 42 Virginia Journal International Law 
(2001­2002) p. 99; Kerry C. O’Neil, ‘A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity? Hirohito 
and Pinochet’, 38 Stanford Journal of International Law (2002) pp. 295­298; Gabriel Bottini, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal Court’, 36 International 
Law and Politics (2004) pp. 530­531, 549­550; Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) p. 45; Malcolm N. 
Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) pp. 668­689; Joyner, 
supra note 1, p. 168; Kontorovich, supra note 1, p. 195; Morris, supra note 1, p. 345; Randall, supra 
note 1, pp. 803­804; Scharf, supra note 1, pp. 369­371; Cowles, infra note 13, p. 194.
15) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 26, citing Willard B. Cowles, ‘Universality of Jurisdiction over War 
Crimes’, 33 California Law Review (1945); see also Lord Wright, Law Reports, ibid., p. x.
16) Ibid.
17) International Law Association, supra note 1, p. 3.
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encouragement of Sir Cecil Hurst, then Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, that paper was expanded in London and Washington during the winter of 
1944­1945. The following spring, the ribbon copy of this larger paper was turned over to 
Mr Justice Jackson’s staff, and a carbon copy used for its publication in the June issue of the 
California Law Review.18
As indicated, it would appear that the argument made by Cowles was accepted 
by the UNWCC, including its U.S. representatives, as well as by the U.S. prose­
cution department, even though it was not based on State practice; rather, 
Cowles had proposed universal jurisdiction de lege ferenda and he was seeking 
to justify the trial of war criminals in the aftermath of World War II. The argu­
ment made by Cowles in support of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is, at 
best, tenuous and, at worst, flawed. Before examining his argument, it should be 
noted that Cowles claimed to examine the right of ‘every’ State to exercise univer­
sal jurisdiction over war crimes; however, on closer inspection, his analysis was of 
a much more limited scope, and concerned the question as to whether “under 
international law, a belligerent State has jurisdiction to punish an enemy war 
criminal in its custody when the victim of the war crime was a national of another 
State and the offense took place outside of territory under control of the punish­
ing State”.19 Although it was not admitted by Cowles, the right under interna­
tional law to which he was referring was that of a “belligerent State” to prosecute 
war crimes “by an enemy” against the nationals of an Allied belligerent in one 
and the same war. As will be explained below, this is not universal jurisdiction 
at all.
The first argument made by Cowles in support of universal jurisdiction over 
war crimes was that international law does not impose any limitation upon a 
State from exercising jurisdiction over foreign nationals abroad. In support of this 
argument, Cowles relied uncritically upon the Lotus case.20 It will be recalled that 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in that case ultimately relied upon 
the principle of objective territorial jurisdiction and it did not, in fact, decide in 
favour of the extreme proposition that any State is permitted to exercise its crimi­
nal jurisdiction over any conduct of any foreign nationals abroad, unless prohib­
ited by international law.21 If international law did not impose any limitations on 
the use and scope of a State’s criminal jurisdiction, then it would be of little 
18) Willard B. Cowles, ‘Trials of War Criminals (Non­Nuremberg)’, 42 American Journal of 
International Law (1948) p. 312.
19) Cowles, supra note 15, p. 178.
20) Ibid.
21) E.g., see the anonymous note on the Lotus case in British Yearbook of International Law 9 (1928) 
p. 134; A. R. Carnegie, ‘Jurisdiction over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War’, 39 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1963) pp. 403­406; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems & Process. 
International Law and How We Use it (Clarendon, Oxford, 1995) p. 77; Vaughn Lowe, ‘Jurisdiction’, 
in Malcolm D. Evans, (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p. 335.
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practical value to speak of permissible principles of international law to prescribe, 
which have long been recognised in doctrine and State practice.22
Cowles took his analysis one step further and argued that universal jurisdiction 
must exist, as opposed to any other principle of jurisdiction, over war crimes. 
To support this argument, Cowles argued that war crimes are analogous to piracy 
on the high seas, which has historically been subject to universal jurisdiction in 
order to prevent such crimes from being committed with impunity. According 
to Cowles, universal jurisdiction is applicable over war crimes, as ordinary law 
enforcement during hostilities is difficult or suspended and all nations have 
an interest in punishing crimes under international law.23 However, Cowles did 
not provide any evidence of State practice of universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes. Despite noting that “the state whose nationals are affected has a primary 
interest” in the punishment of war crimes and acknowledging that “most war 
crimes in the present war [World War II] have been committed ‘against the secu­
rity of the United Nations’ ”, Cowles concluded that, under the doctrine of uni­
versality, “every independent state has jurisdiction to punish war criminals in its 
custody”.24
The argument made by Cowles in support of the development of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes, by analogising them with piracy, is flawed for two 
important reasons. First and foremost, it is based entirely upon the assumption 
that universal jurisdiction has historically developed over piracy; the origins, and, 
indeed, the very legitimacy, of universal jurisdiction are dependent upon piracy.25 
Although it is beyond the endeavours of the present article, it suffices to say that 
jurisdiction has historically developed over piracy under the protective princi­
ple.26 What is more, piracy was described as being ‘heinous’ because it constituted 
the waging of unlawful warfare against the colonial trade of sovereigns, which has 
nothing at all to do with the way in which war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and other human rights offences are described as being heinous by courts and 
commentators seeking to expand universality to include crimes other than 
piracy.27 Secondly, piracy could historically be committed by persons who were 
not sanctioned by any State; it is precisely for this reason why jurisdiction devel­
oped over piracy, as it provided the maritime powers with a mutually beneficial 
22) James L. Brierly and Charles De Visscher, ‘Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime’, 26 American 
Journal of International Law (Spec. Supp.) (1926); Research on International Law Under the 
Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Part II, ‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’, 29 American 
Journal of International Law (Supp.) (1935).
23) Cowles, supra note 15, p. 194.
24) Ibid., p. 218.
25) Princeton Principles, supra note 4, p. 45; Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion 
of Judges Higgins et al., p. 82.
26) Garrod. M. ‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of Universal 
Jurisdiction in International Law’ (Working Paper).
27) Ibid. See also Kontorovich, supra note 1.
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right of protection, on the one hand, and it did not interfere with their own 
sovereign rights on the high seas, on the other.28 The same reasoning does not 
apply to war crimes, as well as crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, 
which were carried out during World War II as part of official State policy. This 
very point was made at the end of World War I by the ‘Committee of Enquiry 
into the Breaches of the Laws of War’.29 There is one final issue: Cowles assumed 
that crimes under international law are ipso facto subject to universal jurisdiction; 
in doing so, he also conflated the distinction as to the basis of jurisdiction over 
war crimes between the protection of vital State interests, which are shared by the 
international community, and universality.30 This crucial distinction will be 
returned to below.
The reliance by Lord Wright on the article by Cowles led him to misinterpret 
the basis of jurisdiction over war crimes. Lord Wright also sought to justify uni­
versal jurisdiction over war crimes by asserting that it had “received the support” 
of the UNWCC.31 The Allied military courts and tribunals involved in the pros­
ecution of enemy war criminals did not, as a general rule, deliver reasoned judg­
ments or specify the basis of their jurisdiction over the accused.32 In fact, in the 
handful of cases where universality is referred to as one of the possible bases of 
jurisdiction over war crimes, it is stated not in the actual judgments of these cases, 
but, rather, in the reports of these cases prepared by the UNWCC.33 However, 
the reasoning of the UNWCC for interpreting these cases as based on universality 
is not persuasive either. This is illustrated by The Almelo Trial. In that case, a 
British military court sitting in the Netherlands convicted German defendants 
for the murder of a British soldier and a Dutch civilian in the Netherlands. As 
regards the former crime, the report of the UNWCC stated that jurisdiction was 
based on the victim as a “member of the British Armed Forces”, which, as will be 
explained below, was based on the protective principle of jurisdiction. As regards 
the latter crime, it was suggested that:
under the general doctrine called Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, every inde­
pendent state has in International Law jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals in its 
28) Ronald Roxburgh, ‘Submarines at the Washington Conference’, 3 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1922­1923) p. 154; Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 421; Morris, supra note 1, 
pp. 339­340; David W. Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and 
Resources’, 53 British Yearbook of International Law (1982) p. 12.
29) ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the 
Laws of War, with Appendices’, 26 February 1920, National Archives, cab/24/111, p. 19; see also 
Hugh H. L. Bellot, ‘War Crimes: Their Punishment and Prevention’, 2 Problems of War (1916) 
p. 43.
30) See Lord Wright, Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 26, citing Cowles.
31) Ibid.
32) Ibid., p. 20; see also International Law Association, supra note 1, p. 22.
33) Law Reports, vol. I, p. ix.
772 M. Garrod / International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 763–826
custody regardless of the nationality of the victim or the place where the offence was 
committed.34
Surprisingly, UNWCC’s report of that case does not provide any evidence of this 
“general doctrine called Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes”; nor does 
it explain the relationship between war crimes and piracy. It is thus not clear the 
basis upon which the UNWCC found universality over war crimes to exist. What 
is more, there is nothing in the reasoning of the court in the Almelo Trial to sug­
gest that it even recognised the existence of universality. The report of the Almelo 
Trial is no different from the two other cases where universality is interpreted by 
the UNWCC as one of the possible bases of jurisdiction over war crimes.35 
Notably, although it was not admitted by the UNWCC, it relied in support of 
universal jurisdiction upon the article by Cowles, which had also been relied 
upon by Lord Wright.36 Crucially, the UNWCC did not give sufficient consider­
ation of the fact that the right of British military courts to sit in Dutch territory 
in the Almelo Trial, as with military courts and tribunals set up by the Allies in 
former enemy occupied territories more generally, was based on an agreement 
between Dutch and British authorities for the prosecution of war crimes by the 
‘enemy’ against British and Allied nationals in one and the same war.37 Moreover, 
the defendants in the Almelo Trial were tried under the British Royal Warrant 
which, as will be explained below, did not provide for universal jurisdiction. Of 
importance to the exercise of jurisdiction over war crimes in the Almelo Trial was 
the status of the victims as ‘Allied’ nationals and of the accused as belonging to 
the ‘enemy’.
The UNWCC and Lord Wright accepted uncritically and without any evi­
dence the concept of universal jurisdiction over war crimes, by relying wholly 
upon the article by Cowles. This, in turn, raises a preliminary yet profound ques­
tion, and one that has to date been overlooked, namely the reason why the 
UNWCC and Lord Wright felt compelled to readily accept Cowles’ argument of 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes. What is more, Cowles’ analogy of war 
criminals with pirates was even adopted by the U.S. Government and used by 
Justice Robert Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the U.S. and Chief Prosecutor before 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in support of jurisdiction over 
34) Ibid., p. 42.
35) The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 53; The Zyklon B Case, Law Reports, vol. I, 
p. 103.
36) This is declared as such by Cowles, supra note 18, p. 312.
37) The agreement between the Dutch and British authorities is referred to in the Preamble to the 
Dutch Law­Decree of 23rd August, 1944 (No. E.66). See also Ian Campbell, ‘Some Legal Problems 
Arising out the Establishment of the Allied Military Courts in Italy’, 1 International Law Quarterly 
(1947) pp. 195­196.
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enemy war criminals for crimes under international law.38 This has important 
implications, particularly as the UNWCC’s work was declared to have “great 
influence upon the moulding of international criminal law and the basis of juris­
diction over war crimes”.39 Moreover, courts and commentators have accepted 
uncritically the reports and conclusions of the UNWCC as a precedent for the 
application of universal jurisdiction over war crimes and other crimes under 
international law. It has also led to the mistaken assumption that international 
law has as its role the suppression of crimes under international law to protect the 
values of the international community.40 The sections that follow examine juris­
diction during the war crimes trials and seek to demonstrate that it is better 
explained under the protective principle.
3. The Prosecution of War Criminals under Control Council Law No. 10
The vast majority of war crimes trials at the end of World War II, which also hap­
pen to be cited most often by commentators in support of universal jurisdiction, 
were undertaken not by the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo for the prosecution of ‘major’ war criminals, but, rather, by domestic 
military tribunals set up by the Great Powers within their respective zones of 
occupied Germany, acting under Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council 
for Germany (Law No. 10).41 It is useful therefore to examine Law No. 10 and 
the jurisdiction of the Great Powers under this agreement. The Control Council 
for Germany, which was comprised of the Great Powers, enacted Law No. 10, 
which had as its purpose, according to its Preamble, first, to “give effect” to the 
Moscow Declaration and the London Agreement, and, second, “to establish a 
uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals … other 
than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.” The acts “recog­
nised as a crime” by Law No. 10 were crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and membership of a group declared criminal by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.42 As regards the scope of Law No. 10, Article III provided that “Each 
occupying authority, within its zone of occupation, shall have the right to cause 
persons within such zone suspected of having committed a crime, including those 
38) International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945, Report to the President by 
Mr. Justice Jackson, 6 June 1945, The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, 
<www.avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp>, 20 March 2012; see also Justice Jackson’s 
Opening Statement for the Prosecution at Nuremberg, 21 November 1945, Nuremberg Trial 
Proceedings, vol. II, ibid., p. 148.
39) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 22.
40) Infra.
41) Law relating to the punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity, enacted at Berlin on 20 December 1945.
42) Ibid., Article II(1).
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charged with a crime by one of the United Nations, to be arrested”.43 It will be 
noted that the jurisdiction of each of the Great Powers was restricted to persons 
“within its zone of occupation”, for crimes committed both within and outside 
of Germany, either against themselves or any of the “United Nations”. An excep­
tion to this was jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, which was restricted 
even further to crimes committed within Germany “by persons of German citi­
zenship or nationality against other persons of German citizenship or nationality, 
or stateless persons”.44 Although the persons subject to Law No. 10 were, accord­
ing to Article II(2), “[a]ny person without regard to nationality”, this was in effect 
restricted to persons belonging to the ‘enemy’. This is affirmed, in addition to the 
Preamble, by Article I, which declared that “integral” to Law No. 10 are the 
Moscow Declaration, “Concerning Responsibilities of Hitlerites for Committed 
Atrocities”, and the London Agreement, “Concerning Prosecution and Punish­
ment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis”.45 That Law No. 10 was 
restricted to the punishment of persons belonging to the ‘enemy’ was also the 
view of Lord Wright.46 Finally, Law No. 10 was limited temporally to crimes 
committed between 30 January 1933 and 1 July 1945.47
Law No. 10 was an inter­Allied agreement between the Great Powers govern­
ing the right to set up military tribunals for the trial and punishment of war 
criminals in Germany. However, in order to prosecute crimes under Law No. 10, 
the Great Powers also had to provide for jurisdiction under their own municipal 
law. The jurisdiction of British military courts for the trial and punishment of 
war crimes arising out of World War II was based on the Royal Warrant of 14 June 
1945, which was an exercise of Royal Prerogative.48 Notably, prior to the creation 
of the Warrant, it was abruptly realised by the British Government, at the end of 
the war, due to a reluctance to try enemy war criminals, that there existed under 
English municipal law no right for British courts to exercise jurisdiction over 
war crimes committed by foreign nationals outside of British territory, “even 
though the crime be committed against a British subject”.49 This meant that 
war crimes by the “enemy” during the “present war” against British and Allied 
nationals in Europe and on the high seas could not be tried due to the lack of 
43) Ibid., Article III (1)(a). The meaning of ‘United Nations’ is a reference to the Allied nations at 
war with the Axis Powers and is not related to the international organisation of that name which 
came into being at San Francisco.
44) Ibid., Article 3(1)(d).
45) See also Article II(5), ibid.
46) History, supra note 10, p. 318; see also The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI.
47) Supra note 41, Article 2(5).
48) Army Order 81/1945. For discussion of the British Royal Warrant, see Law Reports, vol. I, 
Annex I; A. P. V. Rogers, ‘War Crimes Trials under the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945­1949’, 
39 International Comparative Law Quarterly (1990).
49) War Cabinet, ‘War Crimes Bill’, 2 October 1944, National Archives, cab/55/50.
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jurisdiction.50 It was therefore suggested that “in conformity with the Law of 
Nations His Majesty has an undoubted right to authorise the trial and punish­
ment of violations of the laws and usages of war”, either in Britain or “any other 
place”, which are “committed during any war in which He may be engaged”.51  
It was believed that the most appropriate way for Britain to try members of the 
enemy who had committed war crimes against “British subjects” was to set up 
military courts to try them in Germany “or any other place”.52 The jurisdiction of 
British military courts under the terms of the Warrant was explained in the trial 
of Gustav Alfred Jepson, which concerned the prosecution of a Danish and two 
German nationals charged with the ill­treatment and killing of various ‘Allied’ 
nationals. The Prosecutor in that case explained that “war crimes” in the British 
zone means “any violation of the usages of war committed either by the Germans 
or by any person in German employ in which the victims were British or Allied 
nationals […] during any war in which His Majesty has been or may be engaged 
any time since the 2nd September, 1939”.53
The first thing to note is that the jurisdiction of British military courts was not 
universal, which is clear from the reference to “any war in which His Majesty has 
been or may be engaged”. Accordingly, British military courts did not have juris­
diction over war crimes arising out of a war in which Britain was not engaged.54 
The Warrant conferred upon British military courts jurisdiction over any offence 
which constituted “a violation of the laws and usages of war”.55 This meant that 
jurisdiction was narrower in subject matter than Law No. 10 and did not include 
crimes against peace or crimes against humanity.56 Temporally, jurisdiction was 
limited to crimes committed since 2 September 1939, the day after which 
Germany invaded Poland, which was narrower than Law No. 10.57 Finally, the 
jurisdiction of British military courts was limited to war crimes “committed either 
by the Germans or by any person in German employ”. Britain was concerned 
with the prosecution of war crimes against its own and Allied nationals in one 
and the same war. To be sure, the policy of the British Government as to the 
punishment of war criminals was considered in 1942 by the War Cabinet, which 
suggested that each of the Allies should try the cases with which it was 
50) Ibid.
51) Ibid.
52) War Cabinet, ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held in the Prime Minister’s Room’, 
4 October 1944, National Archives, cab/65/44/2; War Cabinet, ‘War Crimes. Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Lord Chancellor’, 14 November 1944, National 
Archives, cab/66/57/48.
53) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 46.
54) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 30; Rogers, supra note 48, p. 789.
55) Supra note 48, Regulation 1.
56) History, supra note 10, p. 216.
57) Supra note 48, Regulation 1.
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“concerned”, including offences committed against its own nationals.58 
Unsurprisingly, priority was given to the prosecution of war crimes against British 
nationals; the prosecution of persons in the British zone accused of war crimes 
against Allied nationals was of a secondary consideration, where such crimes 
could not be tried by the Allied government “concerned”.59 It is also notable that 
the British Government did not recognise the existence of any right of universal 
jurisdiction under international law; it was even cautious of trying enemy nation­
als for war crimes against foreign nationals of Allied nations, which explains why 
the jurisdiction of British military courts was construed in narrow terms.60
The jurisdiction of British military courts is reflective of the practice of the 
other Great Powers in their respective zones of occupied Germany. As with 
Britain, the Soviet Union did not apply directly Law No. 10. The Soviet Union 
had refused to join the UNWCC,61 which was mandated to “investigate war 
crimes committed against nationals of the United Nations”.62 Instead, in order to 
investigate war crimes committed on Soviet territory by enemy forces during the 
war, the Soviet Union issued a Decree of 2 November 1942, which established 
the “Extraordinary State Commission for ascertaining and investigating crimes 
perpetrated by the Germano­Fascist invaders and their accomplices, and the 
damage inflicted by them on citizens, collective farms, social organisations, State 
enterprises and institutions of the USSR”.63 The Soviet Union prosecuted war 
crimes under a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 19 April 1943, 
which provided courts martial with jurisdiction over “German­Fascist criminals 
guilty of great crimes against Soviet citizens”.64 The Decree inter alia did not 
58) War Cabinet, ‘Treatment of War Criminals’, 22 June 1942, National Archives, cab/66/25; see 
also War Cabinet, ‘War Crimes Bill’, 2 October 1944, National Archives, cab/55/50.
59) Cabinet decision of November 1944, National Archives, cab 65/44; A. G. Somerhough, 
Situation Report War Crimes Group, North West Europe to Shapcott, 20 September 1947, 
National Archives, Foreign Office 371 64718/C13471/7675/180; Shapcott Memorandum to the 
Secretary of State for War, the Lord Chancellor and the Foreign Office, 15 October 1947, National 
Archives, Foreign Office 371 64718/C13471/7675/180; Memorandum from Shapcott, 15 October 
1947, National Archives, War Office 32 12197 0160/2573; Claire L. Sharman, ‘War Crimes Trials 
between Occupation and Integration: The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals in the British Zone 
of Germany’, (Unpublished D.Phil Thesis, University of Southampton, 2007).
60) Cabinet Paper, ‘Treatment of War Criminals’, May 1944, National Archives, Lord Chancellor’s 
Office 2/2976.
61) War Office Memorandum 1, 7 January 1947, National Archives, War Office 3212197.
62) War Cabinet, ‘United Nations War Crimes Commission. Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor’, 
2 June 1944, National Archives, 66/50/44.
63) George Ginsburgs, ‘The Nuremberg trial: Background’, in George Ginsburgs and Vladimir N. 
Kudriavstev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
1990) p. 16. See also Ilya Bourtman, ‘“Blood for Blood, Death for Death”: the Soviet Military 
Tribunal in Krasnodar, 1943’, 22 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (2008); Alexander V. Prusin, 
‘“Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!”: The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 
1945­February 1946’, 17 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (2003).
64) Ginsburges, ibid., p. 19.
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legally define war crimes and instead used all­encompassing terms of “atrocities” 
and “evil deeds”.65 Thus, jurisdiction was limited to crimes by the enemy on occu­
pied Soviet territories and against its nationals.
The jurisdiction of Military Government Tribunals in the French zone was 
provided for by French Ordinance and applied to “all war crimes defined by 
international agreements in force between the occupying Powers whenever the 
authors of such war crimes, committed after the 1st September, 1939, are of 
enemy nationality or are agents, other than Frenchmen, in the service of the 
enemy”.66 Military Government Tribunals were also given jurisdiction to punish 
all crimes set out in Law No. 10.67 However, the jurisdiction of these tribunals 
was restricted to crimes by persons belonging to the enemy. The United States 
used Military Government Courts and Military Commissions in its zone of occu­
pied Germany.68 Military Commissions had jurisdiction over violations of the 
laws and customs of war by “enemy combatants and civilians” during military 
operations in which the United States was engaged.69 The jurisdiction of Military 
Government Courts was also restricted to crimes by the enemy which violated 
the laws and customs of war, the laws of “Allied Forces” and the laws of occupied 
territory.70 In order to implement the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
Ordinance No. 7 was passed providing for the establishment in the American 
zone of Military Tribunals with jurisdiction to “try and punish persons charged 
with offences recognised as crimes in … Law No. 10”.71 However, the jurisdiction 
of these tribunals was restricted to the punishment of crimes by persons belong­
ing to the enemy.72
Law No. 10 and the municipal provisions of the Great Powers did not provide 
for universal jurisdiction.73 The Great Powers, as with the other Allied nations, 
were concerned first and foremost with the prosecution of war crimes committed 
by the ‘enemy’ in their own territories, where they had experienced firsthand 
enemy occupation, and against their own nationals. It is important to remember 
65) Prusin, supra note 63, p. 4.
66) French Ordinance No. 20 of 25 November 1945 of the French Commander­in­Chief, Article 
1. For discussion of French Military Government Tribunals in the French zone, see Law Reports, 
vol. III, Annex II.
67) Ordinance No. 36 of 25 February 1946 of the French Commander­in­Chief, Article 1.
68) For discussion of the jurisdiction of United States Military Government Courts and Military 
Commissions, see Law Reports, vol. I, Appendix II; Law Reports, vol. III, Appendix III; Law 
Reports, vol. XV, p. 30.
69) Order of 25 August 1945, paragraph 1a; The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 52.
70) Ordinance No. 2 of the Supreme Commander, Articles 2(1)­(2); see also The Justice Trial, Law 
Reports, vol. VI.
71) Ordinance No. 7, Article 1.
72) The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI.
73) See also Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-
African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General, supra note 
7, para. 14.
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that, although the Great Powers declared to act “in the interests of the United 
Nations”,74 the trial of war criminals would not have occurred had their own 
nationals and national interests not been threatened or injured. There was even 
reluctance in some cases to prosecute war crimes which did not involve their own 
“direct interest”.75 Where the victims of war crimes in German concentration 
camps belonged to more than one of the Allies, it was agreed that prosecutions 
would be undertaken by the Power which occupied the zone in which the 
camp was situated, and the “representatives of all Allied countries whose nationals 
were victims would be taken into consultation.”76 Allied commanders were 
also instructed to forward evidence collected in their own zones “to the United 
Nations Government against whose national or nationals the crime was commit­
ted”.77 In this regard, Law No. 10 provided for the exchange of accused war 
criminals among the four occupied zones and to other Allied nations, so that 
injured States could undertake their own prosecutions, although each zone had 
ultimate power to decide whether, and, if so, which, alleged war criminals would 
be handed over.78 This is consistent with the international agreements concluded 
by the Allies during the war, which provided that accused enemy war criminals 
would be sent back for trial to the particular injured Allied nation.79 As for crimes 
against humanity, namely, the systematic ill­treatment and extermination by 
German authorities of their own Jewish nationals, which were vast and unprece­
dented, the Great Powers had no interest in their prosecution, as they did not 
involve their own or Allied nationals.80 Crucially, jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity was interpreted as requiring a war nexus, whereby they had to be com­
mitted by the enemy during or in connection with the crime of aggressive war in 
which the prosecuting State was engaged, or in connection with war crimes 
74) Declaration of the Great Powers for the establishment of the Allied Control Council, Law 
Reports, vol. XV, p. 37; London Agreement, ‘United States­France­Great Britain­Soviet Union 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis’ 
(8 August 1945), 39 American Journal of International Law (1945), Preamble, para. 5.
75) E.g., see Cabinet, ‘War Crimes: Case of German Generals in British Custody: Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for War’, Cabinet Papers (48) 151, 17 June 1948, National Archives, 
cab/129/28, para. 10; Cabinet, ‘War Crimes: Case of German Generals in British Custody: 
Memorandum by the Attorney­General’, Cabinet Papers (48) 159, 22 June 1948; also, War 
Cabinet, ‘War Criminals. Memorandum by the Attorney­General’, 18 May 1945, National 
Archives, cab/66/65/63.
76) War Cabinet, ‘War Criminals. Memorandum by the Attorney­General’, 18 May 1945, National 
Archives, cab/66/65/63.
77) War Cabinet, ‘War Crimes’, 14 November 1944, National Archives, cab/66/57/48.
78) Supra note 41, Article IV.
79) For text of the Moscow Declaration, see History, supra note 10, pp. 107­108; London Agreement, 
supra note 74, Preamble, para. 3 and Article 4. Anthony Glees, ‘The Making of British Policy on 
War Crimes: History as Politics in the UK’, 1 Contemporary European History (1992) p. 180.
80) Priscilla D. Jones, ‘British Policy towards German Crimes against German Jews, 1939­1945’, 36 
Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (1991).
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therein; otherwise, they had to be committed against their own or Allied nation­
als.81 The war nexus will be returned to below. This attitude towards crimes 
against humanity by German authorities against German nationals was reflected 
in the UNWCC’s mandate, which did not include the investigation of these 
crimes.82 Following the enactment of Law No. 10, Britain and the U.S., in accor­
dance with that law, delegated to German courts the prosecution of crimes against 
humanity.83 Law No. 10 would appear to represent an agreement between the 
Great Powers, which was adhered to by the other Allies, for the punishment of a 
‘common enemy’.
4. The Punishment of Crimes under International Law by a ‘Common 
Enemy’
A crucial fact indicating that the Allies did not exercise universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes, or crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, is that the 
accused were either “enemy nationals”, being of German or Japanese nationality, 
or otherwise persons of any other nationality, including nationals of neutral 
countries, who could be treated as either “serving”, “belonging”, “associating”, 
“identifying” or “assimilating” themselves with the ‘enemy’.84 This represents, it is 
submitted, the punishment by the Allies of crimes under international law by a 
“common enemy”.85 This is supported by numerous official proclamations made 
during the war. The term “Allies” was solidified by the Declaration by the United 
Nations in 1942, which required nations to cooperate in fighting a common 
81) The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 53; The Belsen Trial, Law Reports, vol. II; The Flick 
Trial, Law Reports, vol. IX, pp. 25­26, 44; The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI; U.S. v. Ernst Von 
Weizsaecker et al. (Case XI), 20 December 1947­14 April 1949; In re Ohlendorf and Others, 15 ILR 
656; Prusin, supra note 63, p. 6; Henry Friedlander, ‘The Deportation of the German Jews Post­
War German Trials of the Nazi Criminals’, 29 Leo Baeck Institute Year Book (1984) p. 202; Arieh J. 
Kochavi, ‘The Response to Nazi Germany’s Crimes Against Axis Nationals: The American and 
British Positions’, 5 Diplomacy and Statecraft (1994).
82) War Cabinet, ‘United Nations War Crimes Commission. Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor’, 
2 June 1944, National Archives, 66/50/44.
83) Supra note 41, Article III. See also History, supra note 10, pp. 214, 466; Egon Schwelb, ‘Crimes 
Against Humanity’, 23 British Yearbook of International Law (1946) p. 219; Friedlander, supra  
note 81.
84) See The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 54; The Belsen Trial, Law Reports, vol. II, p. 150; 
The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Law Reports, vol. XI, p. 9; Trial of Susuki Motosuke, Law 
Reports, vol. XIII, pp. 127­129; Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepson, Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 46; Trial of 
Joaquin Espinosa, Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 46; In re Rohrig, Brunner and Heinze, 17 ILR 397; 
Richard R. Baxter, ‘The Municipal and International Law Basis of Jurisdiction over War Crimes’, 
28 British Yearbook of International Law (1951) p. 391.
85) The term “common enemy” was adopted by the UNWCC in its reports on a number of war 
crimes trials, including The Almelo Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 42; The Hadamar Trial, Law 
Reports, vol. I, p. 53; The Zyklon B Case, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 103.
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enemy with whom they were at war.86 The “Moscow Declaration on German 
Atrocities” of 30 October 1943 declared jointly for the first time by the Great 
Powers, and was adhered to by the other Allies, the punishment of crimes 
committed during the war by those “German officers and men and members of 
the Nazi Party” and “Hitlerite forces”.87 The London Agreement, signed by the 
Great Powers, was entitled “the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis”.88 Article 1 of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, annexed to London Agreement, provided for 
the “just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis.” The preambular paragraph to Article 6 of the Charter inter alia, 
which defined the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal ratione materiae as 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, began by stating 
that the accused must have been “acting in the interests of the European Axis 
countries”.89 This suggests that the Allies were concerned with the punishment of 
crimes under international law committed by a common enemy and as part of a 
State policy of aggressive war, in which they were engaged.90 The same may be 
said of the punishment of war criminals in the Far East.91 The International 
Military Tribunal at Tokyo was established by the Allies for the “trial and punish­
ment of the major war criminals in the Far East”.92 More specifically, it had juris­
diction to try and punish Japanese and other enemy “Far Eastern war criminals” 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity, where such persons were also 
“charged with offences which include Crimes Against Peace”.93 In other words, 
Allies were concerned with punishing crimes by a common enemy, which were 
86) See Dan Pelch, ‘How the United Nations beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace’, 22 Global Society 
(2008).
87) Moscow Declaration, supra note 79; see also ‘Punishment for War Crimes: The Inter­Allied 
Declaration of St. James Palace, London, 13 January 1942’, ibid., p. 89.
88) London Agreement, supra note 74.
89) Ibid.
90) See William A. Schabas, ‘State Policy As An Element of International Crimes’, 98 Journal of 
International Criminal Law and Criminology (2008); Guyora Binder, ‘Representing Nazism: 
Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie’, 98 The Yale Journal (1989) p. 1334.
91) See Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, 38 American Journal of International Law 
(Spec. Supp.) (1944) p. 11; Postdam Declaration (26 July 1945) and the Japanese Instrument of 
Surrender (2 September 1945), in Neil Boister and Robert Cryer (eds.), Documents on the Tokyo 
International Military Tribunal. Charter, Indictments and Judgments (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008) p. 3; see also, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in 
Boister and Cryer, ibid.; per Dissenting Opinion of the Member from France, ibid., p. 665; 
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Röling, ibid., pp. 682­683; Judgment of the Honourable 
Mr. Justice Pal, ibid., p. 819.
92) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (26 April 1946), Article 1, in 
Boister and Cryer, ibid., p. 7.
93) Ibid., Article 5; see also, Special Proclamation­Establishment of an International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946), Article 1, in Boister and Cryer, ibid., p. 5.
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part of a State policy of aggressive wars against one or more of the eleven Allied 
nations which established the Tribunal.94
This was reflected in the enactment by the Allies of national laws at the end of 
the war, conferring upon their own domestic courts extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over crimes under international law.95 There is a notable alignment in these 
national laws providing for jurisdiction over international crimes committed by 
persons belonging to a common enemy; this created an important jurisdictional 
nexus with the States prosecuting these crimes. Jurisdiction was also limited to 
crimes during war in which these States were engaged, which provided an impor­
tant temporal nexus. It should also be noted that these national laws provided for 
a nexus to the national interests of the prosecuting State, such as crimes against 
their own or Allied nationals.96 In that connection, the concept of ‘Allied’ nation­
ality was expanded so that inhabitants of former enemy occupied countries could 
be “treated” as Allied nationals.97 This meant that once enemy occupied countries 
had capitulated and accepted armistice with the Allies, the nationals of these 
countries could be treated as ‘Allied’ and jurisdiction could be exercised over war 
crimes which had been committed against them by the enemy.98 It is within this 
94) Solis Horwitz, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, 28 International Conciliation (1950) p. 487.
95) See Australian War Crimes Act of 1945, Law Reports, vol. V; Austrian War Criminals Act of 
1945 (Kriegsverbrechergesetz); Belgian Decree of 1943 and the Belgian Law of 1947, Law Reports, 
vol. XV, Annex I; Canadian War Crimes Regulations of 1945, re­enacted in the Act Respecting War 
Crimes of 1946, Regulation 2, Law Reports, vol. IV, Annex I; Chinese Law Governing the Trial of 
War Criminals of 1946, Law Reports, vol. XIV, Annex I, Czechoslovakian Retribution Decree No. 
16 of 1945, as amended by Law No. 22 of 1946, Law Reports, vol. XV, Annex I; Danish Punishment 
of War Crimes Act of 1946, Law Reports, vol. XV, pp. 32­33; Netherlands Extraordinary Penal Law 
Decree of 1943, Article 4, as amended by Act of 19 July 1947, Article 27A, Law Reports, vol. XI, 
p. 97; In re Rohrig et al., supra note 84; French Ordinance of 1944, Law Reports, vol. III, Appendix 
II; Netherlands East Indies Decree No. 44 of 1946, Law Reports, vol. VI, p. 93; The Norwegian 
Law on the Punishment of Foreign War Criminals of 1946, Law Reports, vol. I, pp. 31, 44; Law 
Reports, vol. III, p. 83; Law Reports, vol. XV, pp. 30­31; Polish Decree concerning the punishment 
of Fascist­Hitlerite criminals guilty of murder and ill­treatment of the civilian population and of 
prisoners of war, and the punishment of traitors of the Polish nation of 1944, and the Polish 
Proclamation of 1947, Law Reports, vol. VII, Annex I, Slovakian Decree No. 33/1945 as amended 
by Decree Nos. 83/1945 and 57/1946; Yugoslav Law on War Crimes and Treasonable Activities of 
1945, Law Reports, vol. XV, pp. 207­209. See also History, supra note 10, pp. 468­475; Axel 
Marschik, ‘The Politics of Prosecution: European Nationals Approaches to War Crimes’, in 
McCormack and Simpson, supra note 1, Chap. 3.
96) See also Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary. I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC, Geneva, 1952) p. 353.
97) Trial of Susuki Motosuke, Law Reports, vol. XIII, p. 129; also, History, supra note 10, 
pp. 172­173.
98) See The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI, p. 79; The Trial of Albert Kesserling, Law Reports, vol. 
VIII; The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Law Reports, vol. XI, p. 10; Trial of Susuki Motosuke, 
ibid., vol. XIII, p. 127; Law Reports, vol. XV, pp. 43, 135; Moscow Declaration, supra note 79; Law 
No. 10, supra note 41, Article 2(1)(b); Nuremberg Charter, supra note 74, Article 6(b). See also 
Baxter, supra note 84; G. Brand, ‘The War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War’, 26 British Yearbook 
of International Law (1949) p. 416.
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context that the Almelo Trial, which has already been discussed above, must be 
understood. It is useful at this point to refer to Lord Wright, whose conclusion as 
to the basis of jurisdiction over war crimes, after examining State practice, is 
revealing:
Under the doctrine of the Universality of jurisdiction over war crimes, international law takes 
account of the crime itself rather than (a) the nationality of the victim (provided that he can be 
regarded as an Allied national or treated as such), or (b) the nationality of the accused (provided 
that he can be regarded as having with the enemy), or (c) the place of the offence.99
It is clear that, despite Lord Wright’s nomenclature, this is not really universal 
jurisdiction at all; and this is the problem with Lord Wright’s reliance upon the 
article by Cowles, instead of examining actual State practice. The result is a fun­
damental mismatch between Lord Wright’s pretensions of universal jurisdiction, 
on the one hand, and the partialities and discriminations of jurisdiction in State 
practice, on the other. This means that universal jurisdiction over war crimes has 
no foundation in State practice in the aftermath of World War II.100 Crucial to 
jurisdiction over war crimes was the status of the accused, as belonging to the 
‘enemy’, and of victims, as belonging to the ‘Allies’. Judge Baxter has rightly 
observed that jurisdiction “falls considerably short” of being universal where it is 
exercised by a belligerent over persons associated with its enemies for crimes com­
mitted against either its own or Allied nationals.101 Rather, as will be discussed 
below, it suggests that jurisdiction was based on the protective principle.102
A more difficult issue faced by the Allies was the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity committed by German authorities against German Jews on 
German territory, which did not constitute war crimes under international 
law; this meant that the victims of these crimes could not be treated, for the 
purpose of jurisdiction, as Allied nationals.103 However, the Allies did not 
exercise universal jurisdiction over these crimes either. The Nuremberg Charter 
provided that crimes against humanity had to be committed in the “interests of 
the European Axis countries” and, moreover, “in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, namely crimes against 
peace or war crimes.104 This was affirmed by the Judgment of the Nuremberg 
    99) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 43 (brackets original but emphasis added).
100) See also Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., 
pp. 70­71.
101) Baxter, supra note 84, pp. 391­392.
102) See also, Vanni E. Treves, ‘Jurisdictional Aspects of the Eichmann Case’, 47 Minnesota Law 
Review (1962­1963) p. 575; Baxter, ibid., p. 383.
103) War Cabinet, ‘United Nations War Crimes Commission. Memorandum by the Lord 
Chancellor’, 2 June 1944, National Archives, 66/50/44; The Justice Trial, Law Reports, vol. VI, 
pp. 40, 79; Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 135. See also History, supra note 10, pp. 174­177.
104) Supra note 86, Article 6, Preamble & Article 2 (c).
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Tribunal.105 The Tokyo Charter expressly stated that crimes against humanity had 
to be committed in connection with crimes against peace to fall within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, although the Allies had no interest in prosecuting these 
crimes in the Far East. In this way, crimes against humanity were interpreted as 
having a war nexus; they were carefully linked with crimes against peace and war 
crimes which, in turn, had the effect of restricting the scope of jurisdiction inter 
alia to the punishment of a common enemy involved in a State policy of aggres­
sive war, in which the prosecuting States were engaged.106 The reasons for impos­
ing this nexus appear to be that the Allies had no interest in the prosecution of 
crimes against humanity beyond or unconnected to the immediate wars in which 
they were engaged. Secondly, by restricting jurisdiction, the Allies sought to pro­
tect, rather than to override, State sovereignty.107 Lastly, it ensured that the States 
prosecuting crimes against humanity had themselves been injured by the aggres­
sive wars of a common enemy, thus providing what was regarded as a sufficient 
jurisdictional nexus over these crimes under international law.108 The protective 
principle would thus appear to have provided the basis of jurisdiction over these 
crimes.109
The State practice at the end of the World War II is illustrative of a trend to 
provide for the trial and punishment of foreign nationals for crimes under inter­
national law. Jurisdiction was, however, restricted to persons belonging to a com­
mon enemy over crimes that were part of a State policy of aggressive war, in 
which the prosecuting States were engaged and had been injured. This suggests 
that the right under international law to punish international crimes was regarded 
as belonging to the injured State.
5. The Right under International Law of the ‘Injured’ State to Punish Crimes 
under International Law
The right to try and punish persons for violating the laws of war has long been 
accepted as a principle under international law and in customary practice to 
belong to a belligerent over its enemy, wherever such individuals should fall into 
105) International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), ‘Judgment and Sentences’, 41 American Journal 
of International Law (1947) p. 249.
106) See Schabas, supra note 90, p. 961.
107) See Beth Van Schaak, ‘The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence’, 
37 Columbian Journal of Transnational Law (1998­1999) p. 791.
108) See Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary­General, supra note 14, pp. 70­72; also, 
Indictment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Counts I & IV, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, vol. I, supra 
note 38; Ginsburgs, supra note 63, p. 35.
109) See also Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 410.
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its power.110 This right of jurisdiction over war crimes, it has been argued, is based 
on the principle of universality and derives from “the bare fact that the person 
charged is within the custody of the Court; his nationality, the place where the 
offence was committed, the nationality of the victims are not generally mate­
rial”.111 However, this is misleading; crucially, the State which has “custody” over 
the accused is not any State whatever, but, rather, the belligerent, or one of its 
Allies, which has been “injured” or “offended” by the violation of the law of 
war.112
The right of the injured State to punish war crimes was recognised in the 
mid­nineteenth century by Moynier, the President of the International Commit­
tee of the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC), in his defence of a proposed reform of 
the 1864 Geneva Convention to fix uniformly criminal punishments for breaches 
of its provisions. According to Moynier, under international law and existing 
State practice, it is possible the offender will be punished under the municipal 
law of his own State; “[o]n the other hand, he may be captured by the enemy who 
has been the victim of his offence, and being then subject to the jurisdiction of 
the enemy’s courts and liable to the penalties which the enemy’s laws imposes”.113 
Similarly, after World War I, it was suggested by the ‘British Committee of 
Enquiry into Breaches of the Laws of War’ that, for centuries, individual offend­
ers of the laws and usages of war, though uncodified, unclear and far from 
110) Edward W. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1890) p. 495; 
History, supra note 10, p. 29. See also the Report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference on 
29 March 1919, ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties’. 14 American Journal of International Law (1920) p. 121, and the Memorandum of 
American Commissioners concurring on this point, ibid., p. 141; Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 26; 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 91, p. 79; per Separate 
Opinion of the President, Sir William Flood Webb, ibid., p. 632; per Concurring Opinion by the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Delfin Jaranilla, ibid., p. 649; per Judgement of the Honourable Mr. Justice 
Pal, ibid., pp. 830, 833; Hans Lauterpacht, ‘The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War 
Crimes’, 21 British Yearbook of International Law (1944) pp. 61­62; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct 
of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004) p. 228.
111) Lord Wright, Law Reports, vol. XV, p. x; History, supra note 10, p. 549. See also the recent 
study by the ICRC, Jean­Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald­Beck (eds.), Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) pp. 605­606.
112) ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the 
Laws of War’, supra note 29, para. 23; Bellot, supra note 29, pp. 43, 52; George Manner, ‘The Legal 
Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the Laws of War’, 37 American 
Journal of International Law (1943) p. 434; Quincy Wright, ‘The Law of Nuremberg Trial’, 41 
American Journal of International Law (1947) pp. 46, 49; Gerald I. A. Draper, ‘The Modern Pattern 
of War Criminality’, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.), War Crimes in International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, London, 1996) p. 155; Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, supra note 91, per Concurring Opinion of the Honourable Mr. Justice Delfin Jaranilla, 
p. 650; per Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Pal, ibid., pp. 818­820; In re Rohrig et al., supra 
note 84.
113) Cited in Pictet, supra note 96, pp. 353­354.
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complete, “have been tried and punished by the Military Courts of the offended 
State, whenever they have come within its jurisdiction or power.”114 Thus, under 
international law, the right to exercise jurisdiction for the trial and punishment of 
war crimes has traditionally been regarded as pertaining to the injured State, 
while the separate issue of obtaining custody of the accused, on the other hand, 
was relevant, as a matter of practicality, to its enforcement. The problem of 
obtaining custody of enemy personnel, which has traditionally depended upon 
the total defeat of the enemy, has meant that actual prosecutions of war crimes 
have been rare and difficult.115 For this very reason, the Allies during World War 
II issued an ultimatum, prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, demanding 
the Japanese Government “unconditionally surrender” all Japanese armed forces 
and leaders so that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals”, other­
wise Japan would suffer “prompt and utter destruction”.116 Similarly, the Allies 
imposed upon Germany, which was said to arise from its “complete defeat 
and utter surrender”, the duty to surrender for trial all persons as requested by the 
Allies, including its leaders.117
The very notion that, under international law, the injured belligerent has the 
right to punish individuals belonging to its enemy postulates that jurisdiction is 
grounded in the recognition by international law of the right of the State to pro­
tect its sovereignty and security and certain other of its vital interests. This appar­
ent principle of protective jurisdiction is by no means novel and, indeed, has its 
roots in the early treatises on international law. It should be noted that, in these 
classical writings, the infliction by a sovereign of punishment over his enemy was 
itself one of the aims of waging a ‘just’ war; of course, no sovereign has ever con­
ceded the waging of war to be unjust. This also suggests that the protective prin­
ciple was bound with a broader right of war. Fransciso de Vitoria wrote in the 
early sixteenth century on the law of war and, in particular, “What and how 
extensive measures may be taken in a just war against the enemy”. Vitoria asserted 
that the sovereign has a right under the law of nations to wage war in order to 
114) Ibid.
115) Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita Case, Law Reports, vol. IV, p. 42. Theodore Meron, ‘The 
Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia’, 72 Foreign Affairs (1993) p. 123; Theodore Meron, 
‘Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals’, 100 American Journal of 
International Law (2006) p. 554; Ernst J. Cohn, ‘The Problem of War Crimes Today’, 26 Problems 
of Peace and War (1940) p. 129; ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of 
Enquiry into Breaches of the Laws of War, with Appendices’, supra note 29, para. 25.
116) Postdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, 26 July 1945), 
paras. 10, 13, in Boister and Cryer, supra note 91, p. 1; Japanese Instrument of Surrender (2 
September 1945), ibid., p. 3.
117) Agreement Between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to be Imposed on Germany (20 September 1945), 
section 10; Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, p. 216.
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“avenge the injury done by the enemy and to teach the enemy a lesson by punish­
ing them for the damage they have done”.118 Vitoria was under no doubt that 
“princes can punish enemies who have done a wrong to their State and that after 
a war has been duly and justly undertaken the enemy are just as much within the 
jurisdiction of the prince who undertakes it as if he were their proper judge.”119 
The justification for punishing the enemy was, according to Vitoria, to secure the 
future peace, tranquillity and security of the nation – “the end and aim of war” – 
which cannot be had unless the enemy is deterred and “restrained by fear of pun­
ishment.”120 This right of jurisdiction over the enemy was, according to Vitoria, 
“granted by the law of nations”.121 Thus, Vitoria considered the punishment of 
the enemy, as one of the aims of war, to be justifiable to effectuate retribution for 
past injuries and to deter future harm. Writing on the law of nations in the fol­
lowing century, Grotius posed the question: “What causes of war may be called 
justifiable?”122 Grotius asserted that “No other just cause for undertaking war can 
there be excepting injury received.”123 Grotius further argued that war may be 
waged for the infliction of punishment.124 Writing on the law of nations in the 
mid­eighteenth century, Vattel asserted that “the just and lawful object of every 
war [is] to avenge or prevent injury”.125 For Vattel, the right “[t]o avenge signifies 
here to prosecute the reparation of an injury … and also punish the offender … 
with a view to providing for our future safety. The right to security authorises us 
to do all this.”126 An important principle of international law, since its modern 
development, is that a sovereign may punish its enemy for past injuries and to 
protect the future security of the State.
In the early twentieth century, Oppenheim, who co­authored the British 
Manual of Military Law of 1914, asserted that “[w]ar crimes are hostile acts of 
soldiers or other individuals as may be punished by the enemy on capture of the 
118) Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (eds.), Vitoria, Political Writings (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1991) pp. 300­304; James B. Scott, The Catholic Conception of International 
Law: Francisco de Vitoria, Founder of the Modern Law of Nations, Francisco Suarez, Founder of the 
Modern Philosophy of Law in General and in Particular of the Law of Nations (Georgetown University 
Press, Washington, 1934); Gregory M. Reichberg, ‘Preventative War in Classical Just War Theory’, 
9 Journal of the History of International Law (2007) pp. 13­14.
119) Scott, ibid., pp. 43, 53.
120) Ibid., pp. 43­44, 53, 55.
121) Ibid., p. 42.
122) Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (Classics in International Law Series, James B. Scott (ed.), 
1925), BK II.
123) Ibid., Chap I, para. 1.4.
124) Ibid., Chap. I, para. 2.2.
125) Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law 
and on Luxury (Bela Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (eds.), Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2008), BK 
III, Chap. III.
126) Ibid.
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offenders.”127 According to Oppenheim, “[e]very belligerent may, and actually 
must, in the interest in his own safety punish these acts”.128 The protective prin­
ciple was recognised as the basis of jurisdiction over war crimes at the end of 
World War I. The Allies, each of whom had been injured by numerous violations 
of the laws and customs of war by Germany, agreed to set up an Inter­Allied 
Commission of Fifteen Members (Commission), which was instructed inter alia 
to report upon “the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed 
by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the 
air during the present war”.129 It goes without saying that each of the Allies was 
concerned with the punishment of persons belonging to a common enemy for 
breaches of the laws and customs of war against their own nationals.130 The major­
ity of the Commission reported that “[a]ll persons belonging to enemy countries 
… who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the 
laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution”.131 It went on to conclude 
that:
Every belligerent has, according to international law, the power and authority to try the indi­
viduals alleged to be guilty of [violations of the laws and customs of war], if such persons have 
been taken prisoner or have otherwise fallen into its power. Each belligerent has, or has the 
power to set up pursuant to its own legislation, an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for 
the trial of such cases.132
It was thus recognised by the Commission the right under international law of 
each of the injured Allies to put on trial in municipal tribunals, upon capture, 
persons belonging to the enemy for violation of the laws and customs of war. 
The United States representatives, while dissenting from the majority of the 
Commission as regards the right to prosecute breaches of the laws of humanity, 
concurred with the majority that a State possesses jurisdiction over war crimes 
by its enemies, regardless of where such crimes are committed, “when the person 
or property injured by the offence is of the same nationality as the military 
tribunal”.133 This was given formal sanction by the Treaty of Versailles, which 
required Germany to hand over to each of the injured Allies for the trial its 
nationals accused of violating the laws and customs of war.134 Although Germany 
127) Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. II, War and Neutrality, (Longmans, 
London, 1912) p. 309, para. 251 (italics added).
128) Ibid., p. 310.
129) ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties’, 
supra note 110, p. 95.
130) See ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of 
the Laws of War, with Appendices’, supra note 29.
131) Supra note 129, p. 101 (italics added).
132) Ibid., p. 121.
133) Ibid., pp. 141, 146­147.
134) The Treaty of Versailles, 28th June, 1919, Articles 228­229.
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ultimately refused to do so, it nevertheless recognised in principle the right of the 
injured State to punish war crimes by its decision, following demands by some of 
the injured Allies, to put on trial a handful of its nationals.135 Thus, at the end of 
World War I, the right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over enemy 
war criminals was regarded as belonging, in addition to the adversary, to the 
injured belligerent.
6. The Use of the Protective Principle at the End of World War II
The war crimes trials reported by the UNWCC at the end of World War II are 
important evidence of State practice. Although there is generally little discussion 
in these reports as to the right under international law to punish enemy war 
criminals, some of the most authoritative cases suggest that it was based on the 
protective principle of jurisdiction.
In The Justice Trial, which involved war crimes and crimes against humanity, a 
U.S. Military Tribunal sitting in Nuremberg, pursuant to Law No. 10, referred to 
the universal application of the law of war but placed great emphasis in the ensu­
ing text, as to the right to punish its violations, on the “injured belligerent gov­
ernment”. Thus, the tribunal held that:
As to the punishment of persons guilty of violating the law and customs of war, it has always 
been recognised that tribunals may be established and punishment imposed by the state 
into whose hands the perpetrators fall. Those rules of international law were recognised 
as paramount, and jurisdiction to enforce them by the injured belligerent government, 
whether within the territorial boundaries of the State or in occupied territory, has been 
unquestioned.136
The tribunal inter alia qualified the “state into whose hands the perpetrators fall” 
by reference to the rights of the “injured belligerent”, which suggests that juris­
diction was based on the protective principle. In this regard, it made a crucial 
distinction, “in connection with the cherished doctrines of national sovereignty”, 
between the “rules of common international law which are universal and superior 
authority on the one hand, and the provisions for enforcement of those rules 
which are by no means universal on the other.”137 While the law of war is of ‘uni­
versal’ application and of “superior authority” to domestic law, the right to pun­
ish its violations is restricted by the tribunal to the “injured belligerent”, which, 
asserted the tribunal, is “paramount” and “unquestioned”. The tribunal went on 
135) See The Llandovery Castle, Germany, Reichsgericht, 16 July 1921; 2 ILR 436; The Dover Castle, 
Germany, Reichsgericht, 4 June 1921; 2 ILR 429.
136) Law Reports, vol. VI, p. 37; see also In re Ohlendorf, 15 ILR 656.
137) Ibid.
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to assert the right of the “offended” State to punish war criminals, “if it can secure 
jurisdiction over the person”.138
The most senior court in the Netherlands, the Special Court of Cassation, In 
re Rohrig, Brunner and Heinze, which involved the deportation of a large number 
of citizens of occupied Holland, stated that the law of nations “empowers a bel­
ligerent State to have enemy war criminals who have offended against its legal 
interests tried by the judicial organs designated by it on the basis of internation­
ally accepted laws and customs of war.”139 The court inter alia held that territorial­
ity is not the only relevant principle of jurisdiction over war crimes committed 
by the enemy against Dutch nationals and, accordingly, in exceptional cases, 
the extension of the Netherlands criminal law to the conduct of foreign enemy 
war criminals abroad was in accordance with international law under the princi­
ple of “protection of national interests”.140 The right of the injured State to try 
enemy nationals for war crimes and crimes against humanity against under 
the protective principle was also the conclusion of the Netherlands Special Court 
of Cassation in the Gerbsch case.141 That case concerned the prosecution of a 
German defendant for “serious ill­treatment of Netherlanders” in a punishment 
camp in Germany, where deported Dutch and Allied nationals had been concen­
trated. At first instance, the Netherlands Special Criminal Court rejected the 
argument that it lacked jurisdiction over a German national for war crimes com­
mitted in German territory, on the basis that Dutch municipal law conferred 
upon Dutch courts’ jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity 
where these were committed against “Dutch subjects or Netherlands interests 
outside Dutch territory”. Thus, the defendant was found guilty of a crime “against 
Netherlanders and against persons through whom the interest of the Netherlands 
was or could be harmed.”142 Notably, this latter sentence suggests the existence of 
a broader right of protective jurisdiction over crimes committed against the 
nationals of other Allies, “whom the interest of the Netherlands was or could be 
harmed”. The decision of the Special Criminal Court was affirmed by the 
Netherlands Special Court of Cassation. While the jurisdiction of the court in 
the Gerbsch case was clearly based on the protective principle, the report of this 
case, prepared by the UNWCC, stated that “the Court invoked the principle 
of the so­called “passive nationality””.143 However, the UNWCC, in finding this 
conclusion, seems to have confused the passive personality and protective 
138) Ibid., p. 38.
139) 17 ILR 397, citing In re Ahlbrecht, p. 397.
140) Ibid.
141) Law Reports, vol. XIII, p. 131.
142) Ibid., p. 132.
143) Ibid., p. 133. The passive personality principle was also reported in the International Law 
Reports; see 16 ILR In re Gerbsch 399.
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principles, and gave insufficient consideration to the Netherlands as the injured 
State.144
In The Peleus Trial, a British military court sitting in the British zone of occu­
pied Germany, pursuant to Law No. 10, stated that its jurisdiction over the 
defendants for war crimes was based on the Royal Warrant and that, as far as 
international law was concerned, the victims involved British nationals. Inter­
estingly, the report on this case by the UNWCC suggested that, given the British 
nationality of the victims on board The Peleus, it was unnecessary for the court to 
have recourse to the fact that Allied nationals were also among the victims and “to 
the still more general question of the universality of jurisdiction over war 
crimes.”145 However, there is no evidence contained within the reasoning of the 
court to suggest that it was even aware that universal jurisdiction existed; more­
over, the court regarded its jurisdiction to be based on the ground that Britain 
was the “injured” belligerent.146
There are many other reported cases which support jurisdiction under the pro­
tective principle, as do the trials before the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo.147 The jurisdiction of these latter Tribunals was defined by 
the terms of their charters and, as has already been discussed above, was limited 
to the prosecution of crimes by a common enemy. The jurisdiction of the Tokyo 
Tribunal was also based on the Postdam Declaration and the Special Proclamation, 
both of which spelled out more clearly as the intention of the Allies the punish­
ment of Japanese war criminals, “including those who have visited cruelties upon 
our prisoners”.148 The right to try Japanese war criminals was expressly restricted 
to any of the nations “with which Japan has been at war”.149 It has to be borne in 
mind that the States which had convened the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
and sought the punishment of enemy war criminals were those that had been 
threatened or injured by aggressive wars and for war crimes against their own 
nationals, as is made clear from the indictments against the defendants and 
the Tribunals’ Judgments. In the words of Justice Robert Jackson, the Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg in his opening statement for the prosecution, the tribu­
nal had been convened by “four great nations, flushed with victory and stung 
144) See Bert V. A. Röling, ‘Supra­National Criminal Law in Theory and Practice’, in F. H. Van 
Panhuys et al., (eds.), International Law in the Netherlands, vol. II (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, the 
Netherlands, 1979) p. 174; see also In re Friedman, 14 ILR 127.
145) Law Reports, vol. I. p. 13.
146) Ibid., p. 12.
147) The Dostler Case, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 24; The Scuttled U-Boats Case, Law Reports, vol. I, 
p. 55; The Abbaye Ardenne Case, vol. IV, p. 97; Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada et al., Law 
Reports, vol. V, p. 9; Ex Parte Quirin and Others 317 U.S. 1, p. 26; see also the Memorandum 
Submitted by the Secretary­General, supra note 14, p. 80.
148) Postdam Declaration, Article 10, supra note 116; Special Proclamation­Establishment of an 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, paras. 2, 7, supra note 93.
149) Special Proclamation, Article 3, ibid.
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with injury”.150 Germany and Japan also both agreed to the surrender for punish­
ment by the injured Allies their leaders and armed forces. It is implicit therefore 
that jurisdiction was based on the protective principle.
It is important to understand that very few of tribunals defended their right 
under international law to exercise jurisdiction over enemy war criminals.151 This 
means that jurisdiction has to be inferred from the facts of each case. However, 
the trials discussed above provide persuasive evidence of State practice that juris­
diction was based on the protective principle. Each of the injured Allies sought to 
obtain custody of enemy war criminals for crimes against their own nationals or 
national interests; the nationality of the accused or the victim, or the place where 
the offence was committed, were regarded as irrelevant.152 This is also supported 
by international agreements concluded by the Allies during the war, including the 
Moscow Declaration and the St. James Declaration.153 It is these agreements 
which provided the backdrop for the enactment by the Allies of municipal laws 
at the end of the war, which provided for jurisdiction under the protective prin­
ciple. The American and British military manuals, which were also used by the 
armed forces of many other nations, provide further important evidence of State 
practice and opinio juris in support of jurisdiction over war crimes under the 
protective principle.154
The validity of the protective principle was recognised before World War II 
over crimes during war and in time of peace,155 and specifically over war crimes.156 
150) Justice Jackson’s Opening Statement for the Prosecution at Nuremberg, 21 November 1945, 
supra note 38.
151) See also Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 416.
152) See also Effie, G. H. Pedaliu, ‘Britain and the Hand­Over’ of Italian War Criminals to Yugoslavia, 
1945­48’, 39 Journal of Contemporary History (2004); Sandra Wilson, ‘After the Trials: Class B and 
C Japanese War Criminals and the Post­War World’, 31 Japanese Studies (2011); Dean Aszkielowicz, 
‘Repatriation and the Limits of Resolve: Japanese War Criminals in Australian Custody’, 31 Japanese 
Studies (2011) pp. 212­216; Hayashi Hirofumi, ‘British War Crimes Trials of Japanese’, 31 Nature­
People­Society; Science and the Humanities (2001).
153) See Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 ILR 263, pp. 263­264.
154) American Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare; British Manual on Military Law, cited in 
The Dostler Case, Law Reports, vol. I, pp. 23­24; also, Law Reports, ibid., vol. XV, p. 22.
155) Re Urios, 1919­22 Annual Digest 107 (No. 70) (Cour de Cassation, France, 1920); also 
Wechsler, Counseil de Guerre de Paris, 20 July 1917; Re Bayot, 1923­4 Annual Digest 109 (No. 54) 
(Cour de Cassation, France, 1923). See also John B. Moore, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the 
Cutting Case (United States Department of State, Washington, 1887); James B. Scott, ‘The Two 
Institutes of International Law’, 26 American Journal of International Law (1932) p. 89; Brierly and 
De Visscher, supra note 22, pp. 253­259; Research on International Law Under the Auspices of the 
Harvard Law School, supra note 22, p. 543; Hans Lauterpacht, (ed.), Oppenheim’s International 
Law, vol. I (Longmans, London, 1967) p. 333; Hans Lauterpacht, ‘Allegiance, Diplomatic 
Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens’, 9 Cambridge Law Journal (1945­1947) p. 343.
156) See Daneil M. Segesser, ‘The International Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes During 
the Balkan Wars and the First World War’, 31 Peace and Change (2006) pp. 537­538; James W. 
Garner, ‘Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War’, 14 American Journal of 
International Law (1920) pp. 77­79; Baxter, supra note 84, p. 383.
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Numerous commentators during and after the war recognised the validity of the 
protective principle over war crimes, as well as over crimes against peace and 
crimes against humanity.157 In this regard, it is useful to refer to the commentary 
of Lauterpacht, who was a member of the International Commission for Penal 
Reconstruction and Development during World War II, whose work informed 
the enactment by the Allies of national laws at the end of the war.158 Lauterpacht 
examined in detail the right under international law to punish enemy war crimi­
nals. According to Lauterpacht:
With regard to acts committed in the territory of the adversary, like the maltreatment of pris­
oners of war, the belligerent may, in applying his municipal law to war criminals, rely on the 
rule, which many states have adopted and which general international law has not stigmatised 
as illegal, that a state may punish criminal acts committed by foreigners abroad against its own 
safety or against its nationals.159
Thus, Lauterpacht was of the view that, “there exists a broader basis, in addition 
to the fact of an uncontroverted custom of warfare, for the rule of international 
law which concedes to belligerents the right to punish such war criminals as may 
fall into his hands.” That basis is one of protection. Even the UNWCC recog­
nised the right of a belligerent to punish war crimes against its nationals to be “an 
undoubted right of international law”.160 The right of the injured State to punish 
war crimes was also recognised in a Memorandum of the U.N. Secretary­General 
and a unanimous resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly at its First 
Session, immediately after the war.161
The State practice at the end of World War II is undoubtedly an important 
development of international criminal law and of the protective principle of juris­
diction. Indeed, since the modern codification of the law of war in the mid­
nineteenth century, there existed no general provisions as to the right to punish 
157) See Edward D. Dickinson et al., ‘Report of the Sub­Committee [of the International and 
Comparative Law Section of the American Bar Association] on the Trial and Punishment of War 
Criminals’, 37 American Journal of International Law (1943) p. 665; Wright, supra note 112, p. 49; 
Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 410; Röling, supra note 144, pp. 172­175, 201; Kevin J. Heller, The 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011) Chap. 5; Roger O’Keefe, ‘The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009) p. 822; Baxter, supra note 84, p. 385; 
Treves, supra note 102.
158) Lauterpacht, supra note 110. For discussion of Lauterpacht’s work in his capacity as one of the 
members of the International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, see History, 
supra note 10, p. 94.
159) Ibid., p. 63.
160) Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 26.
161) Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary­General, ‘Historical Survey of the Question of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction’, (1949) (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7 Rev.1) p. 1; U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 3(I) Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals, First Session on 13 
February 1946.
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its violations or on individual criminal responsibility; moreover, though the right 
to punish violations of the law of war was regarded, as a matter of custom, as 
belonging to the injured State, problems with obtaining custody of the accused 
meant that prosecutions had been few and far between.162
7. The Collective Exercise of Protective Jurisdiction over a Common Enemy
During the trial of enemy war criminals, there occurred many instances of the 
exercise of jurisdiction by one Ally for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity against the nationals of other Allied nations. The basis of this 
jurisdiction may be explained as an expansion of the protective principle, which 
was exercised by some of the Allies, and in certain cases collectively, over a com­
mon enemy in one and the same war. This interpretation of jurisdiction is shared 
by a numerous other commentators.163 It is also supported by some of the national 
laws enacted by the Allies,164 and many of the trials of war criminals.165 The idea 
of collective punishment by each of the injured Allies is also indicated by the cre­
ation of the UNWCC, which had specifically as its role the investigation of war 
crimes by “enemy forces or civilians against nationals of the United Nations … 
during the present war”.166 The right under international law of the Great Powers 
to set up military tribunals in their respective zones of occupied Germany, pursu­
ant to Law No. 10, in order to collectively punish a common enemy for crimes 
against their own and other Allied nationals was defended by a U.S. Military 
162) ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the 
Laws of War’, supra note 29, p. 22; Richard R. Baxter, ‘So­Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, 
Guerrillas and Saboteurs’, 21 British Yearbook of International Law (1951) p. 324; Pictet, supra note 
96, p. 352; Meron, supra note 115, pp. 553­554, 571.
163) See Bowett, supra note 28; Dapo Akande ‘“The Protective Principle”; “The Active Nationality 
Principle”; “The Passive Personality Principle”; “The Territoriality Principle”’, in Antonio Cassese 
(ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009) p. 474; Machteld Boot, Nullem Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court: Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (Intersentia, 
Antwerpen, 2002) p. 211; Röling, supra note 144, pp. 172­175, 201; O’Keefe, supra note 157, 
pp. 822­823; Heller, supra note 157, p. 130.
164) E.g., Australian War Crimes Act, Article 12; the Chinese Law Governing the Trial of War 
Criminals, Article 8; the Norwegian Law on the Punishment of Foreign War Criminals, Article 1; 
the Netherlands Decree on Extraordinary Penal Law, Article 4, as amended by the Act of 19 July 
1947, Article 27; the Yugoslav Law on war crimes and treasonable activities, Article 3.
165) See The Belsen Trial, Law Reports, vol. II; Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Law Reports, 
vol. IV, pp. 3­4, 35; The Hostages Trial, Law Reports, vol. VIII, p. 54; The Dachau Concentration 
Camp Trial, Law Reports, vol. XI, p. 10; Trial of Wilhelm Gerbsch, Law Reports, vol. XIII, p. 135; 
Law Reports, vol. XV, p. 43 and the cases cited therein; In re SS Member Ahlbrecht (No 1), 14 ILR 
196, pp. 197­198; In re Rohrig et al., supra note 84; Röling, supra note 144, p. 175.
166) War Cabinet, ‘War Crimes’, 14 November 1944, National Archives, cab/66/57/48; see also 
Trial of Susuki Motosuke, Law Reports, vol. XIII, pp. 127­8; History, supra note 10, p. 105.
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Tribunal In Re Ohlendorf and Others.167 In that case, the 21 German defendants 
were accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Jews, Gypsies 
and Soviet political officials, “aimed at the destruction of foreign nations”. The 
tribunal inter alia stated that,
[f ]rom time immemorial there have existed rules, laws and agreements which kept opposing 
forces within bounds in the matter of the conduct of warfare … Those who violated these rules 
were subject to trial and prosecution by both the country whose subjects they were and by the 
country whose subjects they maltreated.168
The tribunal went on to explain, however, that there is no authority which denies 
a number of belligerents from agreeing to punish a common enemy for crimes 
against each other’s nationals, and asserted that:
no one would be so bold as to suggest that what occurred between Germany and Russia from 
June 1941 to May 1945 was anything but war, and, being war, that Russia would not have the 
right to try the alleged violators of the rules of war on her territory and against her people. And 
if Russia may do this alone, certainly she may concur with other nations who affirm that 
right.169
The expansion of the protective principle of jurisdiction, for the punishment of 
crimes under Law No. 10 by a common enemy against Allied nationals, was, 
concluded the tribunal, “not only in conformity with International Law but is in 
itself a highly significant contribution to written International Law.”170
In the Trial of Eisentrager and Others, a U.S. Military Commission sitting in 
China convicted German enemy nationals for the breach of surrender terms 
against the United States and its Allies, in violation of the laws and customs of 
war.171 The commission inter alia rejected the argument that it lacked jurisdiction 
over war crimes committed by German nationals on Chinese territory, on the 
ground that China “had invited the United States to send military forces to China 
in order to defeat a common enemy”.172 Perhaps the clearest example of the 
collective exercise of an expanded principle of protective jurisdiction was the 
establishment of International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
which were composed of several Allied nations for the punishment of ‘major’ war 
criminals for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.173 
167) 15 ILR 656.
168) Ibid., p. 663.
169) Ibid., p. 659.
170) Ibid.
171) Law Reports, vol. XIV, p. 8.
172) Law Reports, vol. XIV, pp. 15­16; see also Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada et al., Law 
Reports, vol. V, pp. 9­10.
173) Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non­
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) pp. 627­628; 
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These Tribunals were created on the basis of agreement for the punishment 
of a common enemy, “whose offences ha[d] no particular geographical loca­
tion”,174 which had injured each of the Allies composing the Tribunals. This 
was recognised, albeit impliedly, by the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
which declared that the Allies had, in accordance with international law, “done 
together what any one of them might have done singly”.175 As regards the Far 
East, the major proponent for the establishment of the Tokyo Tribunal was the 
U.S. for retribution against Japan’s leadership for the attack on Pearl Harbour, 
which had initially preferred a small trial relating to that attack and was thus 
of the view that it could punish Japan’s leaders “singly”.176 This interpretation 
of jurisdiction is consistent with State practice at the end of the war, but it 
also comports with the recommendation by the Commission at the end of 
World War I for the establishment of a “High Tribunal” by several of the Allies 
who had each been injured by violations of the law of war by a common enemy.177 
The American representatives to the Commission inter alia also made clear 
that military tribunals of the Allies “affected” by war crimes “may be united, thus 
forming an international tribunal” for the trial and punishment of “the persons 
belonging to enemy countries”, where such persons have “committed outrages 
against a number of civilians and soldiers of several Allied nations”.178 The 
jurisdiction of these tribunals is not capable of supporting the development of 
universality.179 It therefore appears that the exceptional circumstances of the 
war and the need for each of the injured Allies to punish injuries by a common 
enemy provided the necessary solidarity in order to overcome, albeit temporar­
ily,  serious political and ideological tensions between the Soviet bloc and the 
West.180
John Stanton, ‘Canada and War Crimes. Judgment at Tokyo’, 55 International Journal (1999­
2000); Yves Sandoz, ‘The History of the Grave Breaches Regime’, 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2009) p. 673; Wright, supra note 112, p. 49.
174) Moscow Declaration, supra note 79.
175) Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, p. 216. See also Judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 91, per Concurring Opinion by the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Delfin Jaranilla, p. 650.
176) Boister and Cryer, supra note 91, p. xxxvii.
177) ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties’, 
supra note 110, pp. 121­124. See also Bellot, supra note 29, p. 53.
178) Ibid., pp. 141­142.
179) Draper, supra note 112, p. 155; Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction by some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/
Attorney’s General, supra note 7, para. 14. See also ‘“Memorandum of Proposals” submitted by Judge 
Rosenmann to a Meeting Attended by Mr. Eden, Mr. Settinius and Mr. Moltov at San Francisco 
on 3rd May, 1945’, Annexed to War Cabinet, 18 May 1945, National Archives, cab/66/65/63.
180) See Francine Hirsch, ‘The Soviets at Nuremberg: International Law, Propaganda, and the 
Making of the Postwar Order’, 113 American Historical Review (2008).
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This exercise of jurisdiction has led many courts and commentators, including 
the UNWCC and Lord Wright, to assert that it was based on universality.181 
However, this view has been adopted uncritically; it is based on tentative, second­
ary sources, or else primary sources which have been interpreted wholly out of 
context. This is illustrated by the following example. Kontorovich has asserted 
that the tribunals of several Allies relied on universal jurisdiction to justify their 
proceedings, and gave judicial sanction to the analogy of war crimes with piracy 
in support of universality.182 In support of this argument, Kontorovich did not 
examine the trials of war criminals and instead cited the case of Demjanjuk v. 
Petrovsky.183 However, the court in that case did not undertake any primary 
research either and, in support of universality, cited the Restatement (Third). 
The Restatement merely cited erroneous secondary literature to support its asser­
tion that “It is generally agreed that the establishment of these tribunals [the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the tribunals in occupied Germany under Law No. 10] 
and their proceedings were based on universal jurisdiction”.184 What is more, the 
Reporters’ Note inter alia stated, rather unconvincingly, that universality was 
accepted over war crimes and genocide after World War II, “although apparently 
no state has exercised such jurisdiction in circumstances where no other basis for 
jurisdiction … was present”.185 The Restatement (Third) is also inconsistent with 
its predecessor, the Restatement (Second), published in 1965, which did not rec­
ognise universality over these crimes.186 As has already been discussed above, the 
creation by the Great Powers of the International Military Tribunals and the tri­
bunals in their respective zones of occupied Germany are incapable of supporting 
universal jurisdiction. Although it is not realised by Kontorovich, none of the 
tribunals to which he refers gave judicial sanction to universal jurisdiction or to 
the analogy of war crimes with piracy; this was, in fact, done by the UNWCC 
in its interpretation of these cases and, it will be recalled from the discussion 
above, in reliance not on State practice but rather the argument made by Cowles. 
181) Demjanjuk, supra note 1; Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary­General, supra note 14, 
p. 80; Law Reports, vol. XV, pp. 43­44; John Pritchard, ‘The International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East and its Contemporary Resonances’, 149 Military Law Review (1995) p. 33; Henry T. King, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, Prospects, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: 
The Nuremberg Precedent’, 35 New England Law Review (2000­2001) pp. 282­284; Wiliam B. 
Simons, ‘The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg’, in 
Ginsburgs and Kudriavtsev, supra note 63, p. 15; Morris, supra note 1, pp. 341­342; Heller, supra 
note 157, p. 129; Meron, International Criminalisation, supra note 1; Randall, supra note 1; Scharf, 
supra note 1, p. 369; Cryer et al., supra note 1, p. 45; Sadat, supra note 14, p. 245; Brand, supra note 
98, p. 416; Treves, supra note 102, p. 576.
182) Kontorovich, supra note 1, p. 195.
183) Demjanjuk, supra note 1, p. 177.
184) Restatement (Third), supra note 1, para. 404.
185) Ibid., Reporters’ Note One.
186) American Law Institute, ‘Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law’, (1965), para. 34.
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This distorted interpretation of the evolution of universal jurisdiction is com­
monplace in the literature.187 The same may be said of the trial of war criminals 
in the Far East; Pritchard, who has published extensively on the proceedings of 
Tokyo Tribunal and is regarded by many as authoritative, has asserted that it 
“firmly established” universal jurisdiction, without providing any evidence in 
support.188
Universal jurisdiction was not recognised in any of the trials at the end of the 
war.189 Rather, jurisdiction was restricted to crimes by a common enemy which 
had a nexus with the prosecuting State or Allied nations in one and the same war. 
Nor was universality recognised by the preparatory work undertaken on the sub­
ject of jurisdiction by the official and semi­official inter­Allied bodies during the 
war. 190 The absence of State practice in support of universality is significant. Even 
the UNWCC was not wholly convinced that jurisdiction was based on universal­
ity. To be sure, in all of the cases reported by the UNWCC where universality 
was listed as one of the possible bases of jurisdiction over war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, the UNWCC also reasoned that the jurisdiction of the 
prosecuting State was justified under international law on the alternative ground 
that it “has a direct interest in punishing the perpetrators of crimes if the victim 
was a national of an ally engaged in a common struggle against a common 
enemy”.191 Notably, this alternative interpretation of jurisdiction by the UNWCC 
was ignored by Lord Wright and has generally been overlooked by subsequent 
courts and commentators. This gives rise to a further issue; there exist important 
inconsistencies between the UNWCC and Lord Wright, despite both relying 
upon the work of Cowles. Unlike the UNWCC, universality was not claimed to 
exist by Lord Wright over crimes against humanity; on the other hand, neither 
the UNWCC nor Lord Wright recognised universality over crimes against peace. 
It is not clear why one crime was found to be based on universality, while others 
were not. These inconsistencies never were explained away by Lord Wright. 
Moreover, they are reflected in later legal scholarship.
What is often assumed as universality by courts and commentators was in fact 
an expanded principle of protection between Allies in one and the same war. The 
reason for this development of the protective principle was alluded to by the 
Dutch Special Court of Cassation:
187) E.g., Randall, supra note 1; Scharf, supra note 1; Benoit, supra note 1, p. 271; Jordan J. Paust, 
‘Universality and the Responsibility to Enforce International Criminal Law: No U.S. Sanctuary for 
Alleged Nazi War Criminals’, 11 Houston Journal of International Law (1988­1989) p. 340.
188) Pritchard, supra note 181.
189) See also Draper, supra note 112, p. 155.
190) See the conclusions of the International Commission on Penal Reconstruction and Development 
and the London International Assembly, in History, supra note 10, p. 109.
191) The Almelo Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 42; The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 53; The 
Zyklon B Case, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 103.
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[T]he concurrence of two different national jurisdictions was permissible in cases where mem­
bers of the armed forces of the enemy, who had violated, as such, the laws and customs of war, 
were tried after the cessation of hostilities by the competent tribunals of the other belligerent 
in whose power they might have remained, or to whom they might have been extradited for 
that purpose in accordance with an international agreement. Such trial of war criminals by the 
injured party after the war had come increasingly to the fore, particularly since the First World 
War, as a result of the experience that the belligerent powers (especially Germany) could not 
be relied upon to fulfil their obligation themselves to punish those members of their armed 
forces who had transgressed the laws and customs of war. The obvious objections to this state 
of affairs had led since the First World War to the rapid development of international law in 
the direction of personal responsibility for war crimes and to the trial of those responsible 
either by an international tribunal or by tribunals of the injured belligerent.192
The rationale underlying the development of the protective principle was thus 
based on the necessity of the injured belligerent to punish violations of the law of 
war and, in turn, to protect its vital interests. During World War II, the Allies 
were well aware that crimes were a part of official State policy and therefore the 
enemy could not be entrusted to fulfil its obligations under international law, by 
prosecuting breaches of the law of war by their own armed forces and civilians.193 
The broader rationale underlying the protective principle was to prevent the 
impunity of perpetrators of crimes under international law, where crimes had 
some nexus with the prosecuting State or with Allied nations. To that end, the 
protective jurisdiction of the injured belligerent, as was asserted by the Dutch 
Court of Cassation inter alia, was concurrent with that of the enemy.194 It was 
thus the importance of ensuring that threats and injuries to vital State interests 
did not go unpunished why it was important to prevent impunity. This clearly is 
at odds with the proponents of universal jurisdiction, which is said to be based 
solely on preventing the impunity of perpetrators of international crimes because 
of their ‘heinous’ nature. However, the war crimes trials do not give rise to any 
indication that the prevention of impunity had anything to do with crimes under 
international law as being ‘heinous’, or that jurisdiction was exercised over such 
crimes solely on the basis that they were ‘heinous’. Accordingly, the prevention of 
impunity of the perpetrators of ‘heinous’ crimes is incapable of providing a theo­
retical basis for universality over war crimes. As jurisdiction over war crimes was 
based on the protective principle, clearly there was also not an absence of any 
accepted basis of jurisdiction recognised by international law, which is so often 
relied upon by commentators, rather simplistically, in support of the emergence 
of universality.195
192) In re SS Member Ahlbrecht (No 1), 14 ILR 196, pp. 197­198; see also The Hostages Trial, Law 
Reports, vol. VIII, p. 54.
193) See The Hostages Trial, ibid., p. 27; The Hadamar Trial, Law Reports, vol. I, p. 53.
194) See also The Hostages Trial, ibid., p. 54; In re Ohlendorf and Others, 15 ILR 656.
195) See Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 423; Cowles, supra note 15, p. 194; Randall, supra note 1; 
Scharf, supra note 1, p. 371; Kontorovich, supra note 1, p. 195; Claus Kreb, ‘Universal Jurisdiction 
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8. Protective Jurisdiction and the Right of Self-Defence
The broader justification for the protective principle would appear to be based on 
the right under international law of self­defence. As was explained by Hall, 
“[a] belligerent, besides having the rights over his enemy which flow directly from 
the right to attack, possesses also the right of punishing persons who have vio­
lated the laws of war”.196 The relationship between self­defence and protective 
jurisdiction was explained by Chief Justice Stone before the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the case of Ex Parte Quirin and Others in the following terms:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military com­
mand, not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures 
those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort, have violated the 
law of war.197
The right to punish violations of the law of war was qualified to “those enemies 
who … attempt to thwart or impede our military effort”. This suggests that viola­
tions of the law of war are injurious to the adversary, by impeding its “military 
effort”, and that the protective jurisdiction of the offended State is a part of self­
defence. The reasoning of the court inter alia was affirmed by Chief Justice Stone 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in re Yamashita, which upheld jurisdiction to try 
and punish members of the enemy “at war with the United States of America and 
its allies” for violations of the law of war against “the people of the United States 
and its allies and dependencies”.198 This protective jurisdiction over violations of 
the law of war, asserted Chief Justice Stone, operates both during war “as a pre­
ventative measure against such violations” and after the cessation of hostilities as 
an “inherent power to guard against immediate renewal of the conflict” and to 
punish injuries which military operations had produced.199 In the Trial of 
Eisentrager and Others, a U.S. Military Commission sitting in China held that 
“[o]ne of the corollaries of waging war … is the punishment of those that violate 
the laws of war.”200 The commission inter alia appeared to be of the view that the 
collective waging of war by the Allies in self­defence against a common enemy 
entailed a right of collective protective jurisdiction.
over International Crimes and the Instiut de Droit International’, 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2006) p. 575.
196) Hall, supra note 110, p. 395; also Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, supra note 91, per Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Pal, p. 830.
197) 317 U.S. 1, p. 28.
198) Law Reports, vol. IV, pp. 3­4, 35, 41­42.
199) Ibid., pp. 41­42.
200) Law Reports, vol. XIV, pp. 15­16; see also Trial of Lieutenant General Shigeru Sawada et al., Law 
Reports, vol. V, pp. 9­10.
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Lord Wright observed both of the aforementioned Supreme Court decisions, 
which laid down, he asserted, the following principle under international law: 
“[t]he nation attacked is entitled to defend itself, and it is incidental to that that 
it should be entitled to punish those individuals who are guilty of the aggression 
if they fall within its custody”.201 Notably, Lord Wright not only alluded to the 
relationship between the protective principle and self­defence, but he relied upon 
the same reasoning to justify the expansion of the protective principle to include 
crimes against peace. According to Lord Wright, States “are entitled to resist 
unlawful aggressions against their own freedom and independence; hence when 
the aggressive state goes beyond its own boundary and its own domestic affairs in 
order to interfere with the freedom and independence of other sovereign states, 
the latter are entitled to resist and punish aggressor”.202 Although this argument 
made by Lord Wright was controversial at the time, given that the concept of 
crimes against peace under international law was regarded by many as an innova­
tion,203 there is little doubt the Allies, in creating this crime and holding liable 
under international law individuals belonging to the enemy, were punishing inju­
ries to their own sovereignty, security, independence and certain other of their 
vital interests. The Nuremberg Tribunal dedicated the majority of its Judgment to 
discussing the waging by Germany of aggressive wars against the Allies, which it 
described as the “supreme international crime”.204 As regards the Far East, the 
Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 issued by the United States, Britain and 
China declared that “[t]he Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and 
punish the aggression of Japan”.205 The jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal was 
expressly restricted to the punishment of crimes by persons who had also waged 
war against one or more of the Allies.206 The indictment against the defendants 
before the Tokyo Tribunal also makes clear that the Allies were concerned with 
punishing a common enemy for using military force to exclude them from trad­
ing with China and for waging aggressive wars against their colonies in the Far 
East.207 It reasonable to suppose therefore that jurisdiction was based on the pro­
tective principle.208
201) History, supra note 10, p. 20.
202) Ibid., p. 18.
203) See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 91, per 
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Röling, p. 700; per Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Pal, 
ibid., p. 830; see also Kirsten Sellars, ‘William Patrick and “Crimes Against Peace” at the Tokyo 
Tribunal, 1946­1948’, 15 The Edinburgh Law Review (2011).
204) Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, p. 186.
205) Supra note 91.
206) Special Proclamation­Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
supra note 93, Article 1; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Article 5, 
in Boister and Cryer, supra note 91, p. 7.
207) Indictment (counts 1­36), ibid., p. 16.
208) See also Heller, supra note 157, pp. 129­130.
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9. Protective Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of International Law
There is a further consideration as regards the use of protective principle over 
crimes under international law. As was explained by Lauterpacht, it must be 
realised that the injured belligerent punishes war criminals under the protective 
principle but also enforces the law of nations:
For acts committed by members of the armed forces of the belligerent in the course of hostili­
ties can be treated by the municipal law of the adversary as criminal acts only if there is no 
justification for them in international law, that is to say, they are contrary to the law of war … 
War criminals are punished, fundamentally, for breaches of international law.209
There is thus a distinction to be made between crimes under international law, 
which is applicable to all States, and the right to punish its violations by the 
injured State under the protective principle. This distinction was recognised by 
Lauterpacht and was explained in the case of The Justice Trial, which has already 
been discussed above. This distinction is of crucial importance, which has been 
overlooked by the proponents of universal jurisdiction, and will be returned to 
below.
It is the enforcement of international law which has led commentators, includ­
ing the UNWCC, to mistakenly assume that war crimes and other crimes under 
international law are subject to universal jurisdiction.210 Thus, the practice typical 
to Anglo­American countries, such as Britain, Canada and the U.S., suggested the 
UNWCC, is to apply directly international law and “to stress the breach of 
the laws and usages of war … and the violation of any set of legal rules other than 
the laws and usages of war need not be shown.”211 These States did not therefore 
regard it as necessary to expressly specify under their municipal law any head of 
prescriptive jurisdiction recognised by international law in order to punish crimes 
under international law. This approach to jurisdiction was used by the International 
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and under Law No. 10, and was also 
endorsed by the UNWCC, probably under the influence of the U.S. and 
Britain.212 At first glance, this seemingly gives the appearance of jurisdiction as 
209) Supra note 110, p. 64.
210) Meron, supra note 1, p. 572; Roger O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic 
Concept’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) p. 756; J. M. Wagner, ‘US Prosecution 
of Past and Future War Criminals and Criminals Against Humanity: Proposals for Reform Based 
on the Canadian and Australian Experience’, 29 Virginia Journal of International Law (1989) 
p. 887; A. T. Richardson, ‘War Crimes Act 1991’, 55 Modern Law Review (1992) pp. 76­78; 
Michael P. Scharf, ‘The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non­Party States: A Critique of the 
U.S. Position’, 64 Law and Contemporary Problems (2001) p. 82; Paust, supra note 187.
211) Law Reports, vol. III, Annex II, pp. 81­82; see also Annex I­III generally, ibid.; Law Reports, 
vol. XI, Annex; Pictet, supra note 96, p. 353.
212) History, supra note 10, p. 12. See also Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, 
para. 51; Ex Parte Quirin and Others 317 U.S. 1, p. 29.
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being neutral and objective, absent of any nexus, and exercised in the interest 
and on behalf of the “entire world community”.213 On closer inspection, however, 
violations of international law were punished, and international law was thus 
enforced, in carefully selected ways by the offended State. This was observed after 
World War I by the ‘Committee of Enquiry into the Breaches of the Laws of 
War’, which found that Britain had no jurisdiction under its municipal law to 
prosecute war crimes by foreign nationals on the high seas or abroad, even though 
they had been committed against British nationals; nevertheless, it found that 
Britain had the right, as the offended State, to enforce international law directly 
over the enemy, which was implied in the laws and customs of war.214 This 
suggests that the protective principle is built­in to the law of war. It would explain 
why the vast majority of trials at the end of World War II reported by the 
UNWCC, as well as the Judgments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, did 
not expressly defend their right under international law to prosecute war crimes, 
or crimes against peace and crimes against humanity; moreover, generally, no 
attempt was made to explain the vital State interests which had been injured and 
instead stress was placed on the breach of the laws and customs of war. The tradi­
tional approach of Anglo­American States as to jurisdiction over crimes under 
international law is related more to the way that international law is received in 
municipal law.215 It has nothing to do with universality.
The enforcement of international law suggests that breaches of the law of war, 
as violations of international law, in and of themselves, were regarded as injuri­
ous, and sufficient to establish jurisdiction, by the prosecuting State. It is perhaps 
understandable that a belligerent bound by the rules of warfare would find it 
injurious if its adversary would benefit from them without also being so bound. 
It is reasonable to suppose, however, that offended States, by prosecuting war 
crimes, were seeking to punish threats or injuries to their sovereignty and certain 
other of their vital interests, including security, political independence and gov­
ernmental functions. Once it is realised that war crimes are injurious in and of 
themselves, it matters not whether such crimes are committed “systematically” 
and on a “large scale” in order to be subject to the jurisdiction under the protec­
tive principle.216 Moreover, the passive personality principle of jurisdiction over 
war crimes immediately becomes unsatisfactory and irrelevant.217
213) Simons, supra note 181, p. 52; Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 423; Randall, supra note 1, p. 810.
214) ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the 
Laws of War, with Appendices’, supra note 29, pp. 13­28.
215) See R v. Jones and Others [2006] UKHL 16, per Lord Bingham, para. 22.
216) For a contrary view, see Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 412.
217) Numerous commentators have argued that jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is based on the passive personality principle of jurisdiction; see Bassiouni, supra note 14, 
pp. 118­119; Carnegie, ibid., p. 422; Cryer et al., supra note 1, p. 43; Sponsler, supra note 1, p. 47; 
Heller, supra note 157, pp. 128­129.
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The enforcement by States of international law also suggests that international 
law itself recognises that breaches of the law of war are injurious to vital State 
interests, which are common to the international community, and that it has, as 
one of its roles, through the law of war, their protection. It does so by regulating 
the conduct of States in their relations with each other during war and by “pro­
hibiting resort to certain methods of waging war”218 and imposing limitations 
upon “means of injuring the enemy”.219 With the absence of an international 
police force, however, the injured State is permitted by international law to pun­
ish its violations under the protective principle, should the perpetrators fall into 
its hands. This would also explain the reason why international law has tradition­
ally permitted the offended State to resort to reprisals against its ‘enemy’ for viola­
tions of the laws and customs of war.220 Of course, this is not to suggest that the 
rules of warfare are, and have been, at least since their modern codification in the 
mid­nineteenth century, of a progressive humanitarian character, with their 
object being to impose limitations upon the use of violence to protect human 
rights during war.221 However, to focus on the protection of the rights of the 
individual alone, as do the advocates of universal jurisdiction, would appear to 
show less than full appreciation of the realities of the legal situation.222 The breach 
of the law of war by the enemy violates the human rights of the individuals 
concerned, but it no less injures the vital State interests of the adversary. It is 
not really credible or realistic to say that States prosecute war crimes solely for 
the protection of human rights. It has to be realised that the law of war also serves 
to reciprocally protect during war the vital State interests of belligerents.223 
218) Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, p. 218. See also Baxter, supra note 84; 
Baxter, supra note 162; Jean S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary. III Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (ICRC, Geneva, 1960) p. 5.
219) St Petersburg Declaration, Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive 
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (29 November 1868), Preamble; Project of an International 
Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels (27 August 1874), Article 12; 
Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (18 October 
1907), Preamble & Article XXII.
220) See The Trial of Albert Kesserling, Law Reports, vol. VIII, pp. 3­5 and the authorities cited 
therein; Trial of Willy Zuehlke, Law Reports, vol. XIV, p. 144; ‘First, Second and Third Interim 
Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the Laws of War, with Appendices’, supra 
note 29, p. 22; Bellot, supra note 29, pp. 34­35.
221) ‘First, Second and Third Interim Reports from the Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of the 
Laws of War, with Appendices’, ibid., para. 23; St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, Preamble, supra 
note 219; Hague Convention IV, Preamble, supra note 219; Mahmoud C. Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law. A Draft International Criminal Code (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, the Netherlands, 1980) 
p. 77; Hirsch Lauterpacht, ‘The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War’, 30 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1953).
222) Bassiouni, ibid., pp. 6, 12, 43; Hirsch Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Revision of the Law of 
War’, 29 British Yearbook of International Law (1952) p. 362.
223) See also Robin Gieb and Michael Siegrist, ‘Has the armed conflict in Afghanistan affected 
the rules on the conduct of hostilities?’, 93 International Review of the Red Cross (2011) p. 21; 
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Conceptually, the law of war has as its basis a compromise between the protection 
of mutual vital State interests of each of the warring parties and humanitarian 
concerns.224
It is with these considerations in mind that it can be properly understood the 
following assertion by the U.S. Military Tribunal in The Hostages Trial:
An international crime is such an act universally recognised as criminal, which is considered a 
grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control over it under ordinary circum­
stances. The inherent nature of a war crime is ordinarily itself sufficient justification for juris­
diction to attach in the courts of the belligerent into whose hands the criminal has fallen, the 
jurisdiction being concurrent.225
Commentators have frequently cited this statement wholly out of context as uni­
versal jurisdiction.226 However, the tribunal in that case did not recognise the 
existence of universal jurisdiction. The “valid reason” that war crimes could 
not be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose subjects have com­
mitted such acts, as has already been discussed above, is that Germany could not 
be entrusted to fulfil its obligations under international law. The reason the tribu­
nal inter alia stated that the “inherent nature of the war crime” is “sufficient 
justification” for the jurisdiction of the “belligerent into whose hands the crimi­
nal has fallen, the jurisdiction being concurrent”, was because it recognised that 
war crimes are “common law crimes”, that is, crimes under international law and 
binding upon all States, but also because they “violated the rules of warfare” and 
are in and of themselves injurious.227 Thus, while the tribunal asserted that war 
crimes, as violations of international law, are “universally recognised as criminal”, 
in justifying its own jurisdiction, sitting in the U.S. zone of Germany under Law 
No. 10, over the ‘enemy’ defendants in that case, it was careful to stress that the 
right to punish such crimes was restricted to the “belligerent into whose hands 
the accused has fallen”. However, the jurisdiction of the “belligerent into whose 
hands the criminal has fallen” meant “the one whose subjects were the victims of 
the alleged crimes or an allied power.”228 It is for this reason the tribunal in the 
present case went on to state that the “only adequate remedy” is the concurrent 
Alfred P. Rubin, ‘Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offences Erga Omnes’, 35 New England Law 
Review (2000­2001) p. 275.
224) See Neil Lamp, ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New War’ Challenge 
to International Humanitarian Law’, 16 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2011).
225) Law Reports, vol. VIII, p 54 (italics added); see also In re Rohrig et al., supra note 84, p. 395.
226) For example, Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 421; Heller, supra note 157, p. 129; Kreb, supra note 
195, p. 575; Randall, supra note 1, pp. 807­808.
227) Supra note 225.
228) See The Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, Law Reports, vol. XI, p. 10; Trial of Generaloberst 
Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, Law Reports, vol. XI, p. 29; Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, 13 ILR 263, 
pp. 263­264; In re Ohlendorf and Others, 15 ILR 656.
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jurisdiction of the captor belligerent, who may “surrender the alleged criminal to 
the [Allied] state where the offence was committed, or, on the other hand, it may 
retain the alleged criminal for trial under its own legal process.”229 Similarly, In re 
Eisentrager, a U.S. Military Commission sitting in China, in justifying its juris­
diction over war crimes by German citizens in Chinese territory, asserted that 
“A war crime … is not a crime against the law or criminal code of any individual 
nation, but a crime against the jus gentium. The laws and usages of war are of 
universal application, and do not depend upon national laws and frontiers.” 
Yet the commission inter alia restricted the right of jurisdiction over war crimes 
to the injured State or one of its Allies in one and the same war.230 The emphasis 
placed on international law seems to have been in order to demonstrate that such 
conduct was unlawful and to justify the enforcement of jurisdiction over the 
enemy. This interpretation of jurisdiction is consistent with the conclusion of the 
Commission at the end of World War I, which stated, on the one hand, that a 
crime under international law is “an act universally recognised as criminal, which 
is considered a grave matter of international concern”, and, on the other, the right 
of the injured Allies to punish such crimes. There was thus recognised a crucial 
distinction between the universal application of the law of war, as part of interna­
tional law, and the right under international law of the injured State to punish its 
violations under the protective principle. It is to this crucial distinction that the 
article will now turn.
10. The Protection of Vital State Interests ‘Shared’ by the International 
Community
There was a crucial distinction in State practice in the aftermath of World War II, 
which was explained by several cases during the trials of war criminals, between 
the law of war, which is part of international law and therefore of universal appli­
cation, and the right under international law of the injured State, or one of its 
Allies, to punish its violations under the protective principle. The importance of 
this distinction was explained, perhaps most eloquently, in the case of The Justice 
Trial. The tribunal in that case, it will be recalled, asserted the “universality” and 
“superiority” of the law of war, as part of international law, to that of municipal 
law, but made it clear that the right to punish violations of the law of war and 
enforce international law, in order to protect “cherished doctrines of national 
sovereignty”, was restricted by international law to that of the “injured” belliger­
ent.231 Moreover, the tribunal was careful to note that it was not overriding 
229) Supra note 225.
230) Law Reports, vol. XIV, p. 15.
231) Supra note 136, p. 37.
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established principles of international law and that, “[o]nly by giving consider­
ation to the extraordinary and temporary situation in Germany can the proce­
dure here be harmonised with established principles of national sovereignty.”232 
The tribunal was referring here to the fact that it was sitting in the U.S. zone of 
occupied Germany under Law No. 10 and that the one sovereignty involved, 
namely the German Reich, had surrendered unconditionally to the Great Powers. 
The same may be said as to the creation of International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, as both of the relevant States had surrendered uncondi­
tionally. The Allies, in prosecuting crimes under international law, were thus care­
ful to ground jurisdiction in pre­existing international law, and thereby ensuring 
to protect, rather than to “diminish” or “obliterate”, the concept of sovereignty.233 
Thus, the fact that the Allies stressed that particular conduct was regarded 
as criminal under international law, and therefore of ‘international concern’ and 
took precedence over any inconsistent domestic laws of the enemy, does not 
mean that it was subject to universal jurisdiction.234 The prevention of impunity 
for perpetrators of crimes under international law was undoubtedly important 
but only by reason that States were also punishing injuries to their own, or that 
of their Allies, sovereignty and security and certain other vital interests by persons 
belonging to the ‘enemy’.
This raises a further important issue: the proper role of international law within 
the international community. The basis of jurisdiction over crimes under interna­
tional law provides for a more profound understanding of the role of interna­
tional law within the international community and the values that it seeks to 
protect. It would appear that international law has as one of its most fundamental 
roles the balancing of vital State interests shared by the international community 
and which it seeks to protect and, in turn, the prevention of inter­State conflict. 
This balance may be framed in the following terms: international law protects 
sovereignty and certain other vital State interests from the excessive interference 
by other States, by restricting the scope and application of their extraterritorial 
jurisdiction; this is balanced by the right under international law of the injured 
State to punish violations of the law of war in order to protect its own sovereignty 
and certain other vital interests. This balance is important in relation to the debate 
232) Ibid., p. 38.
233) Osofsky, supra note 14, p. 205; King, supra note 181, pp. 282­283.
234) See also Draper, supra note 112, p. 155; Bowett, supra note 28; Boot, supra note 163, p. 213; 
Bottini, supra note 14, p. 515; Carnegie, supra note 21, p. 421; Guenael Mettraux, ‘Dutch Courts’ 
Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes’, 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2006) p. 367; David Scheffer, ‘Opening Address’, 35 New England 
Law Review (2000­2001); Sienho Yee, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’, 10 
Chinese Journal of International Law (2011) p. 507; R v. Bow Street Magistrates’ Court and Others, ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1998] All ER (D) 629, per Lord Slynn, p. 14; Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, 
per Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, pp. 42­44; per Declaration of Judge Ranjeva, ibid.
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in recent years on universal jurisdiction, whose proponents have argued instead 
that the role of international law is to balance the prevention of impunity with 
sovereignty.
The idea that universal jurisdiction developed over war crimes and other crimes 
under international law in the aftermath of World War II is one which has been 
driven mainly by inaccurate scholarly opinion, and is deeply unsatisfactory. 
It gives insufficient consideration to the development of jurisdiction under the 
protective principle; more seriously, it conflates the distinction between jurisdic­
tion based on the protection of vital State interests, which are shared by the inter­
national community, with universality. In particular, it is based on the premise 
that States act as “agents of the international community” and punish war crimes 
to protect the “fundamental interests”, “values” or “vital interests” of the interna­
tional community.235 It is far from clear as to what these values consist; however, 
one such value identified by commentators, the prevention of impunity of the 
perpetrators of international crimes, as an end in and of itself, is falsely elevated 
to a position of superior consideration.236 And, more fundamentally, interna­
tional law is misunderstood as having as its role the protection of values of the 
international community.237 Consequently, it is often assumed that war crimes 
are subject to universal jurisdiction by mere virtue of the fact that they are crimes 
235) See Eichmann, supra note 1, p. 300; Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins et al., p. 79; per Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, ibid., p. 141; per 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al­Khasawneh, ibid.; Pinochet, supra note 14, per Lords Browne­
Wilkinson and Millett; AU­EU Expert Group, supra note 4, para. 9; Institut de Droit International, 
supra note 5; ‘Observations by Belgium on the scope and application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction’, para. 4, <www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri.shtml>, 8 April 2012; Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 308; 
Bruce Broomhall, ‘Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for 
Crimes Under International Law’, 35 New England Law Review (2001) p. 403; Neil Boister, 
‘Transnational Criminal Law’, 14 European Journal of International Law (2003) pp. 963­966; 
Antonio Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Law (2003) p. 591; Georges Abi­Saab, ‘The Proper 
Role of Universal Jurisdiction’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) pp. 599­600; 
Santiago Villalpando, ‘The Legal Dimensions of the International Community’, 21 European 
Journal of International Law (2010) p. 406; Donnedieu de Vabres, ‘The System of Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) p. 925; Baxter, supra note 162, 
pp. 385­386; Bassiouni, supra note 14, p. 104; Bassiouni, supra note 221, Chap. I; Kobrick, supra 
note 14, p. 1522; Kreb, supra note 195, p. 567; O’Keefe, supra note 157, p. 824; Puast, supra note 
187, p. 340; Simmons, supra note 181, p. 137; Wright, supra note 14, p. 280.
236) Villalpando, ibid., pp. 413, 416; Kreb, ibid., p. 571; Arrest Warrant, ibid., per Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, pp. 153­156, 166­167; S­G Report, supra note 3, p. 4; 
Redress, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the European Union. A Study of the Laws and Practice in 
the 27 Member States of the European Union’ (December 2010), p. 19, <www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_States_of_the_European_Union_Final.pdf>, 
20 April 2012.
237) See Arrest Warrant, ibid., per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al.
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under international law.238 This is also often accompanied by claims of the dimi­
nution of State sovereignty and the mistaken assumption that international crim­
inal law and State sovereignty are “enemies”.239
It is necessary therefore, it is submitted, to reconceptualise jurisdiction over 
war crimes, and, indeed, the role of international law, by making a crucial distinc­
tion between the protection of vital State interests, which are shared by the inter­
national community, and universality. Notably, this distinction was overlooked 
by the U.N. General Assembly in its unanimous “affirmation” of the principles of 
international law recognised by the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment,240 and 
also by International Law Commission in the subsequent formulation of the 
“Nuremberg Principles” and in its draft code of “Offences against the Peace and 
Security and Mankind”, both of which included the punishment of war crimes. 
Principle 1 of the Nuremberg Principles, which were adopted by the International 
Law Commission in 1950, provided that “[a]ny person who commits an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and 
liable to punishment”.241 This principle was adopted wholly out of the context 
from which it was derived and overlooks completely that the right to punish 
crimes under international law belongs to the injured State under the protective 
principle. Although the Nuremberg Principles did not recognise the right of uni­
versal jurisdiction, and ultimately were not adopted by the General Assembly, 
they have nevertheless been subsequently interpreted as the implicit affirmation 
238) Eichmann, supra note 1; Princeton Principles, supra note 4, pp. 29, 45; Tadic, supra note 14, 
para. 62; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), ICJ Reports 
2012, per Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, pp. 15­16, <www.icj­cij.org/>, 20 April 
2012; International Law Association, supra note 1, p. 3; Institut de Droit International, Article 
3(a), supra note 5; Redress, supra note 236; Benoit, supra note 1, p. 262; Boister, supra note 235; 
O’Keefe, supra note 157, pp. 823­824; O’Keefe, supra note 210; Kreb, supra note 195, p. 575; 
Langer, supra note 1, p. 3; Paust, supra note 187, p. 340; Luc Reydams, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over 
Atrocities in Rwanda: Theory and Practice’, 1 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice (1996) p. 23; Christopher Stephen, ‘International Criminal Law: Wielding the 
Sword of Universal Criminal Justice’, 61 International Comparative Law Quarterly (2012); Luis 
Parga Peraza, ‘The Concept of Universal Jurisdiction: A Reality in the Making’, The Westminster 
International Law & Theory Centre Online Working Papers, 2009/1.
239) Rob Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?’, 16 European 
Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 988­989; e.g., see Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity. 
A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) p. 8; Kirsten Sellars, 
‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010); 
King, supra note 181, pp. 282­283; Osofsky, supra note 14, p. 205; Parga Peraza, ibid., p. 4.
240) U.N. General Assembly resolution 95(I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law 
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 11 December 1946; U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 177(II), Formulation of the Principles Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 21 November 1947.
241) Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly in the work of its 
Second Session, 5 June­29 July 1950, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, 
Supplement No. 12 (A/1316), reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, 
vol. II, p. 374.
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that crimes under international law, including war crimes, must be subject to 
universal jurisdiction.242
The first case to rely upon the Nuremberg Principles and invoke universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes, was that of Eichmann in 1961. This case is notable 
because it has been relied upon almost exclusively by the proponents of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.243 Yet, rather surpris­
ingly, it has been overlooked time and again that the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Act of 1951 which conferred upon Israeli municipal courts extra­
territorial jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and 
crimes against humanity did not provide for universal jurisdiction; rather, it pro­
vided that war crimes had to be “done, during the period of the Second World 
War, in an enemy country”, while the other crimes listed within the Act had to be 
“done, during the period of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country”. The national 
law of Israel was thus subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as that of the 
other Allies and, given that it was concerned with crimes committed against Jews, 
was likewise based on the principle of protection. Indeed, the District Court inter 
alia found that jurisdiction was valid under the protective principle, as crimes 
against the Jewish people “very deeply concerns the “vital interests” of the State of 
Israel”;244 what is more, the Supreme Court of “fully agree[d] with every word 
said by the [District] Court” and “upheld its criminal and penal jurisdiction by 
virtue also of the ‘protective’ principle”.245 Although Israel did not exist as a sov­
ereign State at the time of Eichmann’s alleged crimes, the issue was whether Israel 
could claim that its “fundamental interests existing at that time had been so 
threatened by the prior Nazi holocaust as to justify the application of the protec­
tive principle.”246 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Israel in that case, relying 
in part upon the academic commentary by Cowles, and misinterpreting State 
practice in the aftermath of World War II and the affirmation of the Nuremberg 
Principles by the U.N. General Assembly, held that crimes under international 
law are subject to universal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was of the view that 
242) See Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, p. 154; 
R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 
[2000] 1 A.C. 147, per Lord Browne­Wilkinson, pp. 197­198; per Lord Millett, ibid., pp. 272­274; 
Benoit, supra note 1, p. 262; Meron, supra note 1, p. 22; Parga Peraza, supra note 238, p. 2.
243) AU­EU Expert Group, supra note 4, para. 9; Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle 
of Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of 
Justice/Attorney’s General, supra note 7, paras. 14 & 19; Memorandum by the Secretariat, Immunity 
of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, International Law Commission, Sixtieth Session, 
2008 (U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596) p. 15; Kenneth Roth ‘The Case for Universal Jurisdiction’, 80 
Foreign Affairs (2001) p. 151; Benoit, supra note 1, p. 273; King, supra note 181, p. 284; Langer, 
supra note 1, p. 2; Osofsky, supra note 14, p. 196; Randall, supra note 1, p. 810; Scharf, supra note 
1, p. 370.
244) Attorney-General for Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 5 (District Court), pp. 49­57.
245) Eichmann, supra note 1, p. 304.
246) Treves, supra note 102, p. 589.
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crimes under international law are of “universal character”, and therefore are sub­
ject to universal jurisdiction. It regarded universality as a logical outcome of the 
Nuremburg Principles. Moreover, it conflated the distinction between the protec­
tion of vital State interests shared by the international community with the pro­
tection of “an agreed vital interest of the international community” and claimed 
to be acting as an “agent of the international community”.247 The decision of the 
Supreme Court to rely on universality and claim to act on behalf of the interna­
tional community for the protection of the vital interests of the international 
community may have been influenced more by the way in which Israel had 
abducted Eichmann from Argentina and the resultant scrutiny of the trial by the 
international community, and the fact that Israel was not in existence at the time 
of Eichmann’s crimes. This latter point was acknowledged as such by the Supreme 
Court in the following terms: “[t]hat being the case, no importance attaches to 
the fact that the State of Israel did not exist when the offences were committed”. 
Yet, it is precisely the fact that Israel lacked universal jurisdiction and that the 
defendant had during the war belonged to the ‘common enemy’ and was a senior 
official, whose name had been included in a list of war criminals wanted by the 
UNWCC and was even mentioned in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal,248 
that Israel’s right to assert jurisdiction, in the words of Lord Millett, ‘never has 
been questioned’.249
Despite the Eichmann case, the conceptualisation of jurisdiction as based on 
the protection of vital State interests shared by the international community has 
been reflected in some of the most important developments in international law 
as well as State practice ever since World War II. It is useful to consider some 
examples in order to illustrate this point.
The crime of genocide under international law is regarded as one of the 
most serious and ‘heinous’, yet the drafters of the Genocide Convention consid­
ered and rejected universal jurisdiction as it would be “against the traditional 
principles of international law and […] might therefore create dangerous interna­
tional tensions.”250 A further example is the jurisdictional regime over war crimes 
adopted through the grave breaches provisions common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.251 Many commentators, who have accepted that universal jurisdic­
tion did not emerge during the trial of war criminals in the aftermath of World 
War II, have argued instead, rather unconvincingly, that universality devel­
oped  under Geneva Conventions.252 Some commentators have argued, rather 
247) Eichmann, supra note 1, p. 300.
248) Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, supra note 105, p. 252; Law Reports, vol. XIV, p. 93.
249) Pinochet, supra note 14, pp. 68­69.
250) Cited in the Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary­General, supra note 14, p. 33.
251) Articles 49(I); 50(II); 129(III); 146(IV); and Article 85 of Additional Protocol I of 1977.
252) Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-African 
States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attorney’s General, supra note 7; 
 M. Garrod / International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 763–826 811
simplistically, that the Geneva Conventions must be based on universal jurisdic­
tion, based on the expression “regardless of their nationality”.253 To accept this 
interpretation is to believe that States had a complete change of mind as to the 
basis of jurisdiction over war crimes, almost overnight, from the protective prin­
ciple to that of universality. This is unlikely, given that universality had no foun­
dation in State practice at that time. In any case, the nationality of the accused 
and of the victim is just as irrelevant under the protective principle. The grave 
breaches provisions, as explained by the authoritative commentary of Pictet, place 
upon High Contracting Parties three obligations.254 The first of these is to enact 
under municipal law the necessary legislation in order, for the first time, “to cre­
ate a certain uniformity of legislation” and “establish what these grave breaches 
were, in order to be able to ensure universality of treatment in their repression.”255  
As explained by Pictet, prior to the Geneva Conventions, “States were left com­
pletely free to punish, or not, acts committed by their own troops against the 
enemy, or, again, acts committed by enemy troops, in violation of the laws and 
customs of war”.256 The second obligation is that each State search for alleged 
offenders who may be on its territory and, if successful, try any person accused of 
a grave breach.257 This has to be read in conjunction with the final obligation, 
which provides that each High Contracting Party may, “if it prefers”, hand the 
accused over for trial “to another High Contracting Party concerned”. The inclu­
sion of this latter obligation indicates that States do not believe grave breaches are 
subject to universal jurisdiction, which has been borne out by the practice of 
States over the past sixty years.258 States had the opportunity to use the principle 
of universal jurisdiction in the grave breaches provisions but chose not to do so.259 
The grave breaches provisions are, in fact, a treaty­based example of the principle 
aut dedere aut judicare.260 It has to be understood that the principle of aut dedere 
AU­EU Expert Group, supra note 4, para. 9; Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends Towards 
Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European 
Journal of International Law (1998) p. 5; Theodore Meron, ‘War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the 
Development of International Law’, 88 American Journal of International Law (1994) p. 80; 
Bassiouni, supra note 14, pp. 117­188; King, supra note 181, p. 283; Meron, supra note 115, 
p. 572; Sandoz, supra note 169.
253) Richard Van Elst, ‘Implementing Universal Jurisdiction Over Grave Breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions’, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law (2000) pp. 820­821; O’Keefe, supra note 157, 
pp. 822­823.
254) Pictet, supra note 96, pp. 358, 362.
255) Ibid., pp. 264, 370.
256) Ibid., p. 352.
257) Ibid., p. 366.
258) Rubin, supra note 223, p. 269; Cassese, supra note 252, p. 5; Sandoz, supra note 173, p. 675; 
Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., p. 76; per Separate 
Opinion of President Guillaume, ibid., pp. 42­44.
259) Bowett, supra note 28; Arrest Warrant, ibid., per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins 
et al., pp. 71­72.
260) Pictet, supra note 96, p. 358; Bowett, ibid.
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aut judicare is not a basis of jurisdiction under international law.261 Rather, it is a 
treaty mechanism used as a means of exercising jurisdiction; it ensures, at least in 
theory, that a State injured by an offence is able to have the accused sent back for 
trial, or else tried on its behalf by the territorial State. It is for this reason that 
Grotius first developed the principle; thus, he argued that the unwillingness of 
Portugal to punish its own nationals for crimes committed against the Dutch 
justified the waging of war by the Dutch against Portugal in order to punish the 
offenders.262 The use of this principle in the Geneva Conventions has to be read 
in light of the quickly deteriorating political alliances in the aftermath of the war, 
in particular, between Western Allies and the Soviet bloc with the emergence of 
the Cold War, and the resultant practical difficulties faced by injured States in 
obtaining custody of accused ‘enemy’ war criminals seeking refuge in “in the ter­
ritories of certain States”.263 The same issue of obtaining custody of accused war 
criminals had arisen at the end of the World War I, which resulted in “a handful 
of trials and in inadequate sentences”.264 Thus, the grave breaches provisions are 
designed to be mutually beneficial, by enabling injured States to punish, or have 
punished by a foreign power, war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the 
accused and the political alliances of the custodial State. If these conventions do 
codify customary international law, as has been suggested by many commenta­
tors, then it may be said that they codify the right of the injured State to prose­
cute, or have prosecuted on its behalf, grave breaches.
Lastly, it is useful to consider briefly some examples of State practice as regards 
the prosecution of war crimes. In the late 1980s, the interest of a small number 
of States in the prosecution of war crimes was revived after it became apparent 
that numerous Nazi ‘enemy’ war criminals from World War II had subse­
quently acquired citizenship in these respective countries, which included Canada, 
Australia and Britain. It is interesting that these States enacted legislation for the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity and, in so doing, claimed 
to be acting under the principle of universal jurisdiction.265 It seems to have been 
261) Yee, supra note 234, p. 513.
262) Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Martine J. Van Ittersum (ed.), 
Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2006) pp. 428­429.
263) See resolution 3(I), adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly; resolution of the 
Inter­American Conference on Problems of War and Peace of 1945; History, supra note 10, p. 413; 
L. C. Green, ‘Canadian Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity’, 59 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1988) p. 218; Luc Reydams, ‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’, Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 37 (2010) p. 17.
264) War Cabinet, ‘Treatment of War Criminals’, 22 June 1942, National Archives, cab/66/25; 
Cabinet, ‘Reply to Holland (Extradition of the Ex­Emperor)’, Cabinet Papers 639, 13 February 
1920, National Archives, cab/24/98; War Cabinet, ‘Warning to Neutrals Not to Grant Asylum to 
Enemy Leaders and War Criminals’, W.P. (44) 484, 30 August 1944, National Archives, 
cab/66/54/34.
265) See Christopher Greenwood, ‘The War Crimes Act 1991’, in Hazel Fox and Michael A. Meyer 
(eds.) Effecting Compliance (The British Institute of International Law, London, 1993) p. 222; 
Green, supra note 263, p. 229.
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forgotten by these States that they had not actually used universal jurisdiction in 
the aftermath of World War II. In any case, this legislation does not, in fact, pro­
vide for universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity either, 
being limited to crimes by persons belonging to a ‘common enemy’ during the 
period of the Second World War, in which these States were engaged, and who 
are subsequently residing in the territory of the prosecuting State.266 The jurisdic­
tional basis of these legislative provisions, and the handful of trials brought under 
them, was thus arguably based on the protective principle.267
In more recent years, the few European States which previously claimed uni­
versal jurisdiction, and who have proclaimed to have “pioneered” this principle,268 
have taken a dramatic about­turn and imposed significant limitations on the 
scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction over war crimes. The municipal law of Spain 
under Article 23(4) of the 1985 Organic Law of the Judicial Power was inter­
preted by the Spanish Constitutional Court as providing for universal jurisdic­
tion over a range of international crimes, including war crimes, to protect the 
interests that “affect the international community as a whole”.269 This differed 
sharply with a number of previous decisions by the Spanish Supreme Court, 
which had interpreted this provision as requiring the existence of a “point of con­
nexion with national interests”, so that “no State may unilaterally establish order 
through criminal law, against everyone and the entire world”.270 This “point of 
connection with national interests” was considered necessary by the Supreme 
Court to legitimise the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes under inter­
national law and avoid an over­extension of national criminal jurisdiction, which 
could otherwise conflict with other principles of international law, including sov­
ereignty and non­interference in internal affairs, and give rise to problems in 
Spain’s international relations. The Supreme Court also observed that there has in 
recent years been a trend to limit the scope of jurisdiction in the legislation of 
other European countries, by requiring some connection with the prosecuting 
State.271 Notably, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 23(4) as requiring 
the existence of a “point of connexion with national interests” or that Spaniards 
are the victims of crimes, which may be understood to be a formulation of the 
266) See Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., p. 69.
267) Polyukhovitch, supra note 1; Demjanjuk, supra note 1; The Queen v. Finta [1994] S.C.R. 701 
(Can); R v. Sawoniuk (Central Criminal Court 1999) (unpublished); Fédération Nationale des 
Déportés et Internes Résistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie 78 ILR 125 (Fr. Cass. Crim. 1983).
268) ‘Observations by Belgium on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdic­
tion’, supra note 235, para. 13.
269) Guatemalan Generals case, S.T.C. No. 237/2005, 26 September 2005 (Constitutional Court).
270) Guatemalan Generals case, No. 327/2003, 25 February 2003 (Supreme Court); see also Scilingo 
case S.T.S. No. 1362/2004, 15 November 2004 (Supreme Court); Jiménez Sánchez and Others v. 
Gibson and Others, No 1240/2006, 11 December 2006 (Supreme Court) ILDC 993 (ES 2006).
271) Ibid.
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protective principle, was codified in Spanish national law in 2009.272 However, it 
is useful to note that, even before this legislative reform, it would appear that 
the Spanish Constitutional Court’s interpretation of ‘universal’ jurisdiction was 
really based on the protective principle, given that the relevant case involved 
crimes against Spanish civilians and an attack against a Spanish embassy and its 
employees and a Spanish ambassador.273 The German Code of Crimes Against 
International Law of 26 June 2002, by virtue of section 153(f ), provides that 
prosecutors may decide not to prosecute war crimes if the accused is not present 
in Germany or the offence has not been committed against a German. The 
Belgian Law of 5 August 2003 significantly limited the scope of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of Belgium over war crimes to circumstances where the victim of the 
offence is a Belgian citizen. This is reflective of the U.S. War Crimes Act of 
1996.274 In addition to restricting the scope of national legislation providing for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes under international law, by requiring 
some jurisdictional nexus, States have also given themselves broad political dis­
cretion over prosecutions, so that jurisdiction will only be exercised where there 
is some nexus.275 A further notable tendency is that the few, particularly European 
countries which have claimed to apply universal jurisdiction have done so selec­
tively, mainly in relation to offences committed by or against their own citizens 
or residents, or where the offence has occurred in a former colonial country, and 
thus where there is some link with the prosecuting State.276 It may thus be reason­
ably questioned whether jurisdiction over war crimes can really be claimed to be 
universal.
11. The Protection of the “Fundamental Values” of the International 
Community
Some commentators have sought to give legitimacy to universal jurisdiction by 
arguing that the principle has evolved as part of a normative framework and link­
ing it with the concepts jus cogens and obligations erga omnes, irrespective of State 
practice in the aftermath of World War II.277 This argument is based on the idea 
272) Organic Law 1/2009, 3 November. See Enrique C. Rojo, ‘National Legislation Providing for 
the Prosecution and Punishment of International Crimes in Spain’, 9 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2011) pp. 710­720.
273) Guatemalan Generals case (Constitutional Court), supra n 269.
274) 18 U.S.C., section 2441(b) (Supp. 1996).
275) See the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, section 153; Belgian Law of 5 
August 2003; German Code of Crimes Against International Law of 26 June 2002.
276) See S­G Report, supra note 3; Bottini, supra note 14, pp. 504­505; Langer, supra note 1; 
Raydams, supra note 263, pp. 26­27.
277) Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under Attack. An Assessment of African 
Misgivings towards International Criminal Justice as Administered by Western States’, 9 Journal 
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of International Criminal Justice (2011) pp. 4­5; Andre de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes 
and Interna tional Crimes. A Theroeteical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of 
the International Responsibility of States (Kluwer, London, 1996) p. 54; Mahmoud C. Bassiouni, 
‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 
(1996) p. 66; Randall, supra note 1, pp. 830­831.
278) Yee, supra note 234, p. 505.
279) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Article 53.
280) Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States) (Merits) ICJ Reports 1986, para. 190, <www.icj­cij.org/>, 20 April 2012.
281) Germany v. Italy, supra note 238, para. 95.
282) Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 
Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, para. 33, <www.icj­cij.org/>, 20 April 2012.
283) Ibid., para. 34.
that crimes under international law are of a jus cogens character and constitute an 
attack on the “fundamental values” of the international community; in turn, each 
and every State forming part of the international community has an obligation 
erga omnes to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes.278 The failure of a State to 
prosecute such crimes either in its own territory or by its nationals, so the argu­
ment goes, is a breach of obligations erga omnes and therefore any other State is 
permitted on the basis of universal jurisdiction to protect the international com­
munity’s “fundamental values”. It is useful therefore to examine briefly the con­
cepts of jus cogens and erga omnes.
The concept of jus cogens first appeared in modern international law in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and provides that “[a] treaty is 
void if … it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law … 
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole”.279 
The International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) has identified as jus cogens the 
prohibition of inter­State force, which it also believed to be “a fundamental or 
cardinal principle” of customary international law,280 and more recently war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.281 However, the Court inter alia has not 
explained the reason why it regarded these crimes as peremptory norms. Beyond 
these categories, there is little agreement as to what peremptory norms of interna­
tional law are accepted by the international community. The concept erga omnes 
was introduced by the dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, where the 
Court proclaimed that:
… an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State … By their very 
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, 
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.282
The Court inter alia identified what it considered as examples of erga omnes obli­
gations, which were acts of aggression, genocide and the protection of individuals 
from slavery and racial discrimination.283 That case did not concern obligations 
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erga omnes and it was a civil case; perhaps understandably, therefore, the Court 
provided little analysis of this concept or of how it came into being; nor did the 
Court explain why it regarded these crimes as erga omnes, or put forward any 
reasoning or criteria for determining whether a certain obligation is of an erga 
omnes character. Given the apparent lack of understanding of the concepts of jus 
cogens and erga omnes in the reasoning of the ICJ, and that the “fundamental 
interests” of the international community are inherently vague and abstract,284  
it may be the case that these concepts are better interpreted to mean the protec­
tion of vital State interests shared by the international community. This interpre­
tation would apply to the Court’s example of aggression, given that it threatens 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and security, all of which are 
vital State interests shared by the international community. Less clear is how this 
interpretation would apply to the other offences identified by the Court, namely 
genocide and the protection of individuals from slavery and racial discrimination. 
These issues are beyond the scope of the present work; the point is that the uncer­
tainty and ambiguity surrounding the concepts of jus cogens and erga omnes, par­
ticularly in the reasoning of the ICJ, suggests that caution should be exercised as 
to how much weight is given to them.
More to the point, even if all States can be said to have a legal interest in the 
protection of the international community’s “fundamental interests”, it does not 
follow that the protection of such interests is based on universal jurisdiction, even 
if a particular crime may be said to be of a jus cogens character.285 A crime under 
international law, which by definition is of universal application and concern, 
given that international law is binding on all States, does not mean that all States 
have a right to exercise universal jurisdiction over it. Since the Barcelona Traction 
case, the ICJ has not recognised that an act in breach of an obligation erga omnes 
and of a jus cogens character as being capable of giving rise to universal jurisdic­
tion. In the Arrest Warrant, the Court held, albeit without express reference to the 
concepts of jus cogens and erga omnes, that it did not recognise any exception to 
the inviolability of an incumbent State official accused of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.286 In the Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall, the Court held 
that Israel was in breach of obligations erga omnes for constructing a wall in 
Occupied Palestinian Territory and therefore “all States are under an obligation 
not to recognise the illegal situation”; however, the Court did not recognise the 
right of universal jurisdiction over such breaches. If the opinio juris of States was 
that crimes under international law breach obligations erga omnes and are of a jus 
 M. Garrod / International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 763–826 817
287) See Article 48 and the commentary therein, reprinted in James Crawford (ed.), The International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 
p. 276.
288) Guatemalan Generals case (Constitutional Court), supra note 269, para. 5.
289) Villalpando, supra note 235, pp. 413, 415.
290) E.g., see Kreb, supra note 195, pp. 573­576.
cogens character and therefore are capable of giving rise to universal jurisdiction, 
then this perhaps would have been recognised by States in the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility,287 or agreed in the formula­
tion of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC).
The interpretation of the concepts erga omnes and jus cogens as permitting a 
right of universal jurisdiction has developed almost entirely, if not exclusively, out 
of legal scholarship de lege ferenda. In the Guatemalan Generals case, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court employed the jus cogens line of reasoning to uphold the 
validity of the concept of universal jurisdiction, yet it was only able to cite “legal 
scholars” in support of this proposition.288 It may be one thing to proclaim that 
crimes under international law are erga omens and jus cogens, but it is a great con­
ceptual leap to suggest that these concepts permit and give legitimacy to universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law. It may be argued, with equal 
force, that certain vital State interests shared by the international community and 
protected by international law, such as sovereignty and sovereign equality and 
independence, non­interference in internal affairs and the inviolability of incum­
bent State officials, have the status of erga omnes and jus cogens. Thus, the question 
may fairly be posed whether it really is credible to invoke these concepts in order 
to justify universal jurisdiction and, in turn, override principles of international 
law which are capable of equally having the same status and character. On the 
contrary, wherever there is a conflict between perceived “fundamental values” of 
the international community and vital State interests shared by the international 
community, there has been a marked reluctance in State practice to proclaim the 
primacy of the former.289 Whatever may be the scope and application of jus cogens 
and erga omnes, which remain controversial, contested and equivocal, stretching 
them beyond their reasonable interpretation and the authority which they are 
capable of supporting, without any debate or agreement by States, as have the 
proponents of universal jurisdiction, risks undermining their validity and inter­
national law. Ultimately, relying upon jus cogens and erga omnes substitutes one 
misinterpretation of the evolution of universal jurisdiction, namely in the after­
math of World War II, for another.
Perhaps a more persuasive argument made in support of the possible evolution 
of a permissible right of universal jurisdiction over war crimes in customary inter­
national law, irrespective of State practice in the aftermath of World War II, is 
the subsequent reference made by States to universality.290 This has been described 
as a “modern positivist” understanding of the process of international law­ 
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making, which focuses on the evolution of customary international law by 
placing significant weight on “verbal State practice”, rather than “hard” State 
practice.291 It is not the purpose of the present work to assess generally the method 
of ascertaining customary international law through this approach, or to under­
take a thorough analysis of the present state of the law. Rather, the question is 
whether universal jurisdiction should be regarded as having evolved over war 
crimes in ‘verbal’ State practice and capable of being a valid right of customary 
international law, irrespective of actual State practice at the end of World War II. 
On close inspection, however, this is far from clear. Cases such as Eichmann and 
Demjanjuk, which have already been discussed above, relied heavily upon State 
practice in the aftermath of World War II in order to give legitimacy to claims of 
universal jurisdiction, despite misinterpreting that practice as being based on uni­
versal jurisdiction. Both of these cases are specific and context dependent, with a 
focus on the prosecution of crimes by persons belonging to a ‘common enemy’; 
moreover, jurisdiction was based on the protective principle. It is also doubtful 
that Israel or the U.S. would accept the validity of universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes in a different context, or if the accused involved their own nationals and 
were being prosecuted by another State.292 One would possibly have to accept 
these cases at a superficial level in order to rely on them as evidence or precedents 
for the evolution of ‘verbal’ State practice in support of a permissive right of uni­
versal jurisdiction under customary international law. An alternative interpreta­
tion is that these cases have served to entrench misunderstanding as to the basis 
of jurisdiction over war crimes.
Beyond these cases, a cautious approach should be adopted in relying on verbal 
State practice to support the evolution of universal jurisdiction over war crimes in 
customary international law, as claims may be lofty, inconsistent and even based 
on misinterpretations and erroneous assumptions as to what is the concept of 
universal jurisdiction; indeed, many States claim the right of universal jurisdic­
tion over war crimes but, on closer inspection of their national laws and military 
manuals, it is apparent that they are really referring to the mechanism of extradite 
or prosecute, which is a wholly different concept.293 It should thus be of little 
surprise that States may make verbal claims as to the right of universal jurisdic­
tion and then do something quite different in actual practice. On the other 
hand, States may claim an all­encompassing and expansive right of universality 
over war crimes, even though there is a link with the prosecuting State and other 
jurisdictional principles, including the protective principle, are applicable. This is 
illustrated by the 1998 Pinochet case, in which Spain’s National Court Criminal 
Division upheld on the basis of universal jurisdiction an arrest warrant issued by 
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a Spanish investigative judge against Pinochet for ‘terrorism’, genocide and tor­
ture, even though more than 50 Spanish nationals had been among the victims 
which was held to give Spain a “legitimate interest in the exercise of such jurisdic­
tion”.294 In the Scilingo case, the alleged victims of international crimes included 
Spanish nationals and the Spanish Supreme Court held that this gave Spain a 
“national interest” in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, which effectively 
amounted to the affirmation of the protective principle.295 It is also illustrated in 
a wholly different context, namely the response by maritime powers in recent 
years to the problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, which are claiming expansive 
jurisdiction under universality in order to protect their own vital trade routes and 
merchant shipping, without having to prove evidentially any nexus with accused 
pirates. A crucial question is the way in which verbal State practice in support of 
the evolution of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is informed; States may 
make reference to a customary right of universal jurisdiction over war crimes by 
relying upon secondary sources, which are themselves inaccurate and based on 
misinterpretations.296 This latter point is further illustrated by the two following 
examples.
The ICRC in its recent study of customary international law has relied upon 
verbal State practice to support the rule that States have the right to exercise uni­
versal jurisdiction over war crimes.297 A review of this study by the U.S. rejected 
the ICRC’s conclusion for a number of reasons. These include the practice cited 
by the ICRC does not support universal jurisdiction; universality envisions juris­
diction over war crimes with no relation to the prosecuting State, yet many of the 
national laws cited by the ICRC rely upon other principles of jurisdiction, includ­
ing the protective principle, or depend upon a territorial connection to the act 
before a State may exercise jurisdiction; there is very little evidence of actual 
prosecutions of war crimes based on universal jurisdiction; and, lastly, the ICRC 
conflates jurisdiction under treaty obligations with customary international 
law.298 To this it may be added that the ICRC has assumed that war crimes are 
subject to universal jurisdiction by mere virtue that they are crimes under 
international law and that universality was “first established” in the extradite or 
prosecute mechanism in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.299 At the same time, in 
294) See Pinochet, supra note 234, per Lord Slynn, p. 5.
295) Supra note 270.
296) E.g., see Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-
African States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General, supra note 
7, para. 19.
297) Henckaerts and Doswald­Beck, supra note 111, vol. I, p. xlvi.
298) John B. Bellinger and William J. Haynes, ‘A US government response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International Humanitarian Law’, 89 International 
Review of the Red Cross (2007) pp. 466­471.
299) See Jean­Marie Henckaerts, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law: a response to US 
comments’, 89 International Review of the Red Cross (2007) p. 476.
820 M. Garrod / International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 763–826
300) Henckaerts and Doswald­Beck, supra note 297, p. 604.
301) Kreb, supra note 195, p. 574.
302) Ibid., p. 575.
order to support the actual use of universality over war crimes, the ICRC has 
relied upon State practice in the aftermath of World War II, including the 
Ahlbrecht case and In re Rohrig et al., both of which, it will be recalled, were based 
on the protective principle.300 The other example is the scholarly work of Kreb. 
Kreb has argued that universal jurisdiction has evolved over war crimes and other 
crimes under international law on the basis of verbal State practice; however, the 
basis of his argument is that war crimes have been “elevated … to the level of 
crimes under international law” and that States have declared in the preamble of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC that “such crimes must not go unpunished”.301 Kreb 
also supported his argument by interpreting wholly out of context the reasoning 
of the U.S. Military Tribunal in The Hostages Trial.302 Kreb’s conclusion that this 
must be “seen as a strong indication in favour of a customary state competence to 
exercise universal jurisdiction” is therefore extremely doubtful.
Perhaps the main problem with relying upon verbal State practice in support 
of a customary right of universal jurisdiction over war crimes is that such verbal 
claims are often informed, and even dependent for their validity, upon what is 
perceived to have been the use of universality in actual State practice in the after­
math of World War II. This verbal practice may be said to retain its validity for 
the formation of custom, irrespective of whether or not universal jurisdiction 
actually developed in the aftermath of World War II. On the other hand, it may 
be said to misconstrue the proper basis of jurisdiction over war crimes; this imme­
diately becomes problematic when States attempt to go beyond mere claims 
and to use universal jurisdiction in actual practice, which in turn threatens 
vital State interests which are shared by the international community and pro­
tected by international law. Assuming for a moment that universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes has evolved in verbal State practice subsequently to World War 
II, then it could perhaps be fairly assumed that the validity of this principle and 
its scope and application has over several decades crystallised into a norm of cus­
tomary international law. Yet the debate in recent years on universality would 
suggest the contrary; it is this debate to which the final part of this article will 
now turn.
12. The Debate on Universal Jurisdiction
One of the most heated debates of recent years in modern international law has 
been the scope and application of universal jurisdiction, which has been on the 
agenda of the U.N. General Assembly and the Sixth Committee since 2009, after 
complaints by the Group of African States that it was being used selectively and 
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politically abused, particularly over African officials, by a handful of European 
States.303 The essence of this debate is the perceived conflict between two values 
of international law, namely preventing the impunity of perpetrators of interna­
tional crimes on the basis of universality, on the one hand, and protecting the 
principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality and political independence and the 
immunities of incumbent State officials, on the other.304 The comments and 
statements made by governments illustrate the controversial, political nature of 
the concept of universality, and the lack of clear agreement as to its scope 
and application. More importantly, they also reveal great confusion as to the 
validity of this concept, and indeed, its very foundation, under international law. 
Interestingly, the African States are of the view that universal jurisdiction did 
not develop in State practice in aftermath of World War II.305 Nevertheless, 
the debate has taken as its starting point the assumption that the validity of 
universal jurisdiction under international law is beyond doubt, and that 
international law permits States to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes 
under international law, including war crimes, to prevent impunity.306 Thus, the 
African Union, in its request for the inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the 
agenda of the General Assembly, having undertaken a “thorough study”, declared 
that
[u]niversal jurisdiction is a well­established principle of international law the purpose of 
which is to ensure that individuals who commit grave offences, such as piracy, slavery, torture, 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, do not do so with impunity.307
It went on to emphasise that “the controversy surrounding the concept of univer­
sal jurisdiction is not about whether the concept validly exists, but rather about 
the scope of its applicability.” Just one year later, however, before the Sixth 
Committee, the Group of African States retreated from its earlier position and 
asserted that:
[t]here was as yet no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction and no agreement 
on which crimes, other than piracy and slavery … it would apply … [and that] the principle 
hardly existed in most domestic jurisdictions.308
303) Supra note 7.
304) S­G Report, supra note 3, paras. 108­111.
305) Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by some Non-African 
States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General, supra note 7, 
para. 14.
306) Ibid., para. 9; see also S­G Report, supra note 3, paras. 27­28, 54; AU­EU Expert Group, supra 
note 4, para. 9; Decision of Assembly of the African Union on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse 
of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, para. 3.
307) U.N. General Assembly resolution, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction, supra note 7.
308) Cited in Yee, supra note 234, p. 524.
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309) See the comments and observations made by States at the Sixty­Fifth and Sixty­Sixth Sessions 
of the Sixth Committee in 2010 and 2011 respectively, <www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUni 
.Juri.shtml>, 20 April 2012.
310) China, Malaysia, Sudan, ibid.
311) Julia Geneuss, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Reloaded? Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal 
Jurisdiction. A Comment of the AU­EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, 
7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009) p. 951; Charles C. Jalloh, ‘Universal Jurisdiction, 
Universal Prescription? A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal 
Jurisdiction’, 21 Criminal Law Forum (2010).
312) See Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, per Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, p. 154; 
per Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al., ibid., pp. 79, 86; Germany v. Italy, supra note 
238, per Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade; van der Wilt, supra note 277, p. 2.
313) Redress, supra note 236; Amnesty International, ‘Ending Impunity: Developing and 
Implementing a Global Action Plan Using Universal Jurisdiction (October 2009), <www.amnesty 
.org/en/l ibrary/asset/IOR53/2009/en/2aaca/92d­915d­40a3­808f­46b5f2e799ae/
ior530052009en.pdf>, 15 April 2012.
Nevertheless, the debate on universal jurisdiction has focused almost exclusively 
on the scope and application of this concept. Consequently, little attention has 
been dedicated as to whether, and, if so, on what basis, universality is valid under 
international law. The broad and unsubstantiated claim first made by the African 
Union as to the validity of universality under international law for the prevention 
of impunity is common in the statements made by many other States.309 Only a 
few States have made statements questioning universality’s validity over war 
crimes.310 Beyond this, however, the validity of universality has gone questioned. 
The same may be said of the surrounding literature, which has presupposed that 
universal jurisdiction is already valid in international law.311 The lack of critical 
analysis of universality’s foundation has meant that the prevention of impunity 
on the basis of this principle has been elevated to a position of great importance, 
and even exaggerated. As has already been discussed above, in the aftermath of 
World War II, jurisdiction developed over war crimes under the protective prin­
ciple, out of the necessity of the injured State to punish enemy war criminals; 
what is more, jurisdiction had nothing to do with the idea that war crimes are 
‘heinous’, and the prevention of impunity had nothing to do with universality. 
Thus, the idea that international law has as one of its roles the prevention of 
impunity of the perpetrators of war crimes because of their ‘heinous’ nature and, 
to that end, permits States to exercise universal jurisdiction, seems to lack any 
foundation under customary international law. Rather, what is often described 
as a “movement in modern international criminal law” since the 1990s towards 
the pursuit preventing the impunity of perpetrators of international crimes, 
through the creation of ad hoc tribunals and more recently the International 
Criminal Court, has been misunderstood as the synonymous development of 
universal jurisdiction.312 This is a view which has been driven forward, in 
particular, by international human rights organisations313 and by works such as 
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the International Law Association (2000),314 Institute of International Law 
(2005)315 and the International Association of Penal Law (2009),316 as well as the 
ICRC,317 which have been taken “into account” by the debate on universal 
jurisdiction.318
The present debate on universality would thus appear to be wrongly postu­
lated; while the prevention of impunity is important, there is no basis in custom­
ary international law for States to use universal jurisdiction and undermine vital 
State interests which are protected by international law and shared by the inter­
national community, including sovereignty, sovereign equality and political inde­
pendence and the immunities of incumbent State officials.319 This certainly seems 
to have been the implied view of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant.320 Similarly, States 
have declared in creating the ICC the importance of preventing the impunity of 
perpetrators of the “most serious crimes of international concern”, including war 
crimes, but nevertheless have reaffirmed the importance of State sovereignty and 
the territoriality of jurisdiction by deliberately not granting to the ICC universal 
jurisdiction.321
It should also be noted that the debate on universality has been undertaken in 
almost complete isolation from other principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
recognised by international law, most importantly the protective principle; more­
over, it is apparent that there is little or no understanding of the historical devel­
opment of the protective principle over war crimes, which has instead been 
interpreted in overly­narrow terms as the protection national currency.322 With 
these considerations is mind, it should therefore be of little surprise that the Sixth 
Committee has remained divided as to the scope and application of universality, 
and unable to reconcile this concept with vital State interests shared by the inter­
national community.
314) Supra note 1.
315) Supra note 5.
316) International Association of Penal Law, Resolution of the XVIIIth Congress, Section IV – 
International Criminal Law, Universal Jurisdiction, <www.penal.org/?page=mainaidp&id 
_rubrique=24&id_article=95>, 20 April 2012.
317) Statement of the ICRC representative in the Sixth Committee (U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.12) 
(15 October 2010); also <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/statement/united­nations­universal 
­jurisdiction­statement­2010­10­15.htm>, 25 April 2012.
318) S­G Report, supra note 3, para. 111.
319) See Villalpando, supra note 235, pp. 413­415.
320) Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, p. 33; see also per Separate Opinion of President Guillaume, ibid.; 
per Declaration of Judge Ranjeva, ibid., p. 57; per Separate Opinion of Judge Rezek, ibid., p. 93.
321) Rome Statute, Preamble and Articles 1, 17.
322) AU­EU Expert Group, supra note 4, para. 12.
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13. Conclusion
This article has sought to challenge the common understanding that universal 
jurisdiction emerged over war crimes in the aftermath of World War II, and to 
demonstrate that jurisdiction instead represented an important development of 
the protective principle in customary international law. As has been shown, the 
protective principle was also expanded by some of the Allies, and even exercised 
collectively, over war crimes against the nationals of other Allied nations in one 
and the same war, for the punishment of a ‘common enemy’. This alternative 
view as to the development of jurisdiction over war crimes has either been over­
looked or given insufficient consideration by courts and commentators. The pro­
tective principle should therefore be regarded, it is submitted, as one of the 
foundations of international law. This raises important considerations as to the 
nature, scope and application of the protective principle in modern international 
law, which is little understood. There is also fundamental confusion between the 
protective principle and the universality and passive personality principles of 
jurisdiction, and the concepts of universality and extradite or prosecute.323 In that 
connection, the present national laws and military manuals of many States can be 
interpreted as providing for jurisdiction over war crimes under the protective 
principle and, in some cases, war crimes against the nationals of Allied nations, 
which reflects State practice in the aftermath of World War II.324
It is not clear the reason why the UNWCC and Lord Wright accepted uncriti­
cally the proposal made by Cowles as to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes, especially as there was no basis for this under international law 
at that time. It may have been that universal jurisdiction was proposed by Cowles, 
and was readily accepted by the UNWCC and Lord Wright, in order to give the 
impression that the prosecution of enemy war criminals was neutral and objec­
tive, seemingly for the benefit of the international community, in anticipation of 
potential criticism. Indeed, the punishment of enemy war criminals and the cre­
ation of International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo at that time 
faced accusations of victors’ justice and were regarded by some as contentious.325 
The UNWCC was not itself a body for universal justice; it was partial, tasked 
with investigating war crimes by the ‘enemy’ against ‘Allied’ nationals. In any case, 
subsequent courts and commentators have accepted uncritically the article by 
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Cowles and the work of the UNWCC and Lord Wright. It is notable that the 
U.S., which had endorsed the argument made by Cowles at that time, has since 
rejected the idea that war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction; thus, the 
only way that the U.S. is now able to justify universality over certain other crimes 
is merely on the basis that they are offences under international law.326
The trial of war criminals in the aftermath of World War II undoubtedly was 
an important development for international criminal law, but it cannot be said to 
have given rise to universal jurisdiction. The development of jurisdiction over war 
crimes also had nothing to do with them being of a ‘heinous’ nature, or solely for 
the prevention of impunity of the perpetrators of crimes under international law. 
This calls into doubt the supposed theoretical foundation of universality over war 
crimes. These findings are important, as the advocates of universality have often 
gone out of their way to invoke State practice in the aftermath of World War II 
to support the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction under present customary inter­
national law. One of the most prominent of these is the ICRC, which has a con­
siderable influence on shaping the views and ‘verbal’ practice of States, as well as 
legal scholarship.327 This article has also suggested that universal jurisdiction inca­
pable of being supported as a permissive right under current international law by 
the concepts of jus cogens and erga omnes, or by ‘verbal’ State practice. Universality 
over war crimes has thus been accepted uncritically by courts and commentators 
and has been allowed to develop as a myth, a hollow concept, which is sur­
rounded by substantial misunderstanding. This may explain why universal juris­
diction has proven to be ineffective in preventing impunity, despite this being its 
essential justification; and why it has remained stagnant in ‘hard’ State practice.
These considerations mean that some other legal basis must be found to sup­
port universal jurisdiction over war crimes, but it would not have the backing of 
history or State practice. It also has important implications for those seeking to 
expand universality over other crimes under international law. It is reasonable to 
call into question the validity of the debate in recent years on universality before 
the U.N. General Assembly and Sixth Committee, which has started from the 
premise that universality is valid under customary international law. It is apparent 
from the comments and statements made by governments that the purpose for 
which the concept of universality stands­the prevention of impunity­is regarded 
as morally commendable, and even politically appealing, and there is therefore a 
reluctance to object to its legitimacy; and yet, at the same time, governments have 
made clear that the use of universal jurisdiction against their own nationals would 
be an abuse of jurisdiction and a violation of international law. There is thus a 
326) See ‘Submission Information and Observations on the Scope and Application of the Principle 
of Universal Jurisdiction’, <www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/
UnitedStates.pdf>, 25 April 2012.
327) Henckaerts and Doswald­Beck, supra note 111, pp. 604­605.
826 M. Garrod / International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012) 763–826
crucial distinction between rhetoric, or verbal State practice, and actual State 
practice; this poses obvious problems for ascertaining accurate evidence of opinio 
juris. It is perhaps understandable why some States may find the concept of uni­
versality appealing, given that it provides them with broad prosecutorial discre­
tion to protect their own, or their Allies, vital interests, without the burden of 
having to prove any nexus with the accused or the offence. It is precisely for the 
same reason that Anglo­American States have traditionally claimed the right to 
enforce international law directly over enemy war criminals. Nevertheless, the 
debate on universality has given insufficient attention that the concept lacks any 
foundation under customary international law. It should therefore be of little 
surprise that the Sixth Committee has to date been unable to reconcile the 
concept of universality with vital State interests which are shared by the interna­
tional community and protected by international law, including sovereignty and 
sovereign equality and independence and the immunities of incumbent State 
officials.
The debate on universal jurisdiction has highlighted more than ever that the 
time may now be ripe to abandon once and for all this concept and to reconcep­
tualise jurisdiction over war crimes as based on the protection of vital State inter­
ests which are shared by the international community. This better reflects the 
traditional development of jurisdictional principles under international law and, 
indeed, the role of international law itself. The consequence of this view is that 
those war crimes and other crimes under international law that do not affect the 
vital interests of any foreign State, and that are not prosecuted by the territorial 
State in which they are perpetrated, will have to be dealt with by the U.N. Security 
Council or the ICC.328 The Security Council and the ICC both have their limita­
tions, which are beyond the present work. This does not, at first glance, appear to 
be either a satisfactory or appropriate outcome. Yet problems of this nature are 
nothing new in international law. Nor is it a problem that would, or should, 
necessarily be solved by universal jurisdiction. The perceived utopia in the after­
math of World War II was not achieved by universal jurisdiction. Rather, it is 
questionable whether international law should be interpreted beyond its proper 
role and to undermine the vital State interests shared by the international com­
munity which it seeks to protect, by permitting States with a right of universal 
jurisdiction. As long as the view is maintained that international law has as its role 
the prevention of impunity, for the protection of values of the international com­
munity, and, to that end, permits States to exercise universal jurisdiction, then it 
will continue to be distorted and incapable of providing for stable inter­State 
relations; it will also face accusations of being selective, effective in some situa­
tions and impotent in others, and incapable of providing universal justice.
328) The same point has been made by the Spanish Supreme Court in the Guatemalan Generals case, 
supra note 270.
